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Editorial note 
This Working Paper forms part of a series of five volumes 
dealing with the "Europeanisation" of product safety law. They 
are the result of a study carried out on behalf of the Commission 
of the EC which has so far been published only in German*. Tue 
publication of this English version has been made possible by a 
graut from Directorate General XI. 
Tue five volumes of this series of Working Papers should 
thus be read in context. Volume 1 (Chapter 1) aims to show why 
product safety law has given rise to extremely diverse regulation 
patterns and to provide an overview of the most important 
instruments for action. 
Volumes 2 and 3 (Chapter II) are concerned with recent 
developments in the relevant legislation of the economically most 
important Community Member States and of the United States. 
Volume 2 (Chapter II, Parts 1 and 2) contains reports on France 
and the United Kingdom, Volume 3 (Chapter II parts 3 and 4) 
deals with the Federal Republic of Germany and the US 
Consumer Product Safety Act 1972, which is of crucial 
importance in the international debate. 
Volume 4 (Chapters ill and IV) analyses the development of 
the "traditional" policy of approximation of law and of efforts at a 
"horizontal" European product safety policy. In both policy areas 
it proved impossible to realise the Community's programmatic 
* Christian Joerges, Josef Falke, Hans-W. Micklitz, Die Sicherheit von 
Kosnumgütem und die Entwicklung der Gemeinschaft, Baden-Baden: 
Nomos 1988. 
III 
goals. As far as policy on achieving the internal market is 
concerned, the Commission itself has pointed out the reasons and 
cal!ed for, and implemented, a fundamental revision of traditional 
legal approximation policy. This reorientation of Community 
policy is dealt with in Chapters IV; it describes the most 
important precursors of the new internal market policy, namely 
ECJ case law on Articles 30 and 36 EEC since the Cassis de 
Dijon judgment, and regulatory technique for the Low Voltage 
Directive and then analyses the new approach to technical 
harmonisation and standards, whereby the Community will 
restrict itself in its directives to setting "essential safety 
requirements", leaving it to European and national 
standardisation bodies to convert these safety requirements into 
technical specifications. 
Volume 5 (Chapters V and VI) evaluates the effects of the 
Community's new approach to technical harmonisation and 
standards on product safety policy. Chapter V diagnoses a new 
need for action in the area of product safety policy, including in 
particular the intemal organisation of the standardisation process, 
and participation by consumer associations in European 
standardisation. Chapter VI continues a comprehensive 
discussion of alternatives open for co-ordinating internal market 
and product safety policy. lt argues that a policy of 
"deregulating" Member States' product safety legislation would 
not be feasible, and opts for a "positive" supplementation of the 
new approach by a horizontal Community product safety policy. 
This option is elaborated in a number of recommendations. 
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Chapter V: 
The need to supplement the new approach to technical 
harmonisation and standards with a coherent European 
product safety policy 
The declared primary objective of the new approach to 
technical harmonisation and Standards is to overcome the stagna-
tion in law approximation policy and thus promote the realisation 
of the European intemal market. Our survey of the most impor-
tant aspects of the new approach has, however, already shown 
that the regulatory technique of reference to standards continually 
comes up against problems of product safety policy. Let us men-
tion only the controversies about the degree of perception of the 
"basic safety requirements"I, the unsolved problems of recogni-
tion of national certification2, the decision-making powers of 
Member States under the safeguard clause procedure3 and the en-
dangerment of intemal market policy through the reservations in 
Art. 100 a (4) SEA4. The following sections will go beyond these 
already visible points of contact to systematically consider the ef-
fects of the new approach on the beginnings of a European safety 
policy. lt will not question the principle of the regulatory aspects 
of the new approach, but instead seek to bring out the ensuing 
problems the Community will have to solve if it is to push 
through its new harmonisation policys. 
1 Chapter IV, 3.2 supra. 
2 Chapter IV, 3.3.2 supra. 
3 Chapter IV, 3.3 and 3.6 supra. 
4 Chapter IV, 4.1 supra. 
5 That the Commission is itself in principle aware of these implications 
is documented by the Commission communication of23 July 1985, "A 
new impetus for consumer policy", COM (85) 314 final, point 19 et 
seq„ Commissioner Varfis' answer to EP question N' 2778/85, OJ C 
1. Product safety obligations 
Wherever it harmonises areas of law that also involve the 
safety of products, the Community must lay down a binding or 
optional European safety level. Here, the "traditional" method of 
approximation of laws has led to a many-faceted range of product 
safety duties. Tue Low Voltage Directive6 provides for protection 
only given "proper use". Tue medicaments Directive7 uses the 
same standard. By contrast, the consumer policy programmes of 
1975 and 1981 used the terms "normal" or "foreseeable"8. This 
formulation was taken up both in the preamble to the Directive 
on cosmetics9 and in the decision on the exchange of information 
on product hazardslO, whereas the "new impetus for consumer 
protection policy" speaks only in general terms of the "need" to 
set "safety requirements at the Community level" 11 . Tue Product 
Liability Directivel2, finally, refers to the justified safety expec-
tations of users "taking all circumstances into account", in partic-
ular the "reasonably" foreseeable use. Tue relevant formulations 
in the model Directive of 4 May 198513 are kept vague: " ... 
products ... may be placed on the market only if they do not en-
------ -- - - - -------- ~ 
277 of 3 November 1986 and the Commission communication to the 
Council on "Inclusion of consumer policy in the other common poli-
cies" of 24 October 1986, COM (86) 540 final, 5 et seq.; and the ensu-
ing Council resolution of 15 December 1986, OJ C 3, 7 January 1987, 
1. 
6 OJ L 77 of 26 March 1973, 29 (An. 2); cf. Chapter IV, 2 supra. 
7 OJ L 147 of9 June 1975, 1. 
8 Chapter III, 3.1 supra. 
9 OJ L 262, 27 September 1976, 169. 
10 OJ L 70, 13 March 1984, 6; cf. Chapter, 3.4 supra. 
11 Commission communication to the Council (note 5 supra) COM (85) 
314 final, point 21. ' 
12 OJ L 210, 7 August 1985, 29 (An. 6); cf. for more details Chapter III, 
3.5 supra. 
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danger the safety of persons, domestic animals or goods when 
properly installed and maintained and used for the purposes for 
which they are intended". Furthermore, "in certain cases, in par-
ticular with regard to the protection of workers and consumers, 
the conditions set out in this clause may be strengthened 
(foreseeable use)". Tue vagueness of this text seems striking; 
first, "intended" use is introduced as the normal criterion, but 
then the rule-exception relationship is reversed again because the 
reference to protection of workers and consumers applies to al-
most all conceivable goods; furthermore the tightening up of 
safety obligations in the areas mentioned is only a prospective 
possibility, and finally inevitable differentiations such as those of 
users' age are lacking. In any case the structure of the Model Di-
rective shows the Community's general tendency to orient the 
level of protection in consumer goods to "foreseeable" use. Fur-
thermore, even the first two directives or proposals for directives 
submitted on the basis of the Model Directive introduced an un-
avoidable differentiation. While the Directive on simple pressure 
vessels seeks to guarantee the safety of persons, domestic animals 
and goods only given "proper use"l4, toy manufacturers have to 
take "foreseeable" use into account, bearing in mind the "normal 
behaviour of children", and also take differences in children's 
ages into accountI5. Tue framework of the Model Directive is of 
fundamental importance in other respects too. lt takes account of 
the fact that the reference method leaves the Community legisla-
tor's responsibilities for product safety unaffected and that har-
monisation covering broad groups of products presupposes the 
laying down of appropriate safety duties. We will later retum to 
the question whether this insight - still expressed in the Model 
Directive in relatively open, and above all non-mandatory, for-
13 OJ C 136, 4 June 1985, 1, Section B II. 
14 OJ L 220, 8 August 1987, (Art. 2 (1)), 148. 
15 Cf. Art. 2 (1) and Annex II to the proposal for a directive on safety of 
toys, OJ C 282, 8 November 1986, 4. 
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mulations - is to lead to the positive introduction of a Community 
general clause on product safety16. 
2. Intemal market policy priorities and the demon-
stration project on accident information systems 
Tue list of "criteria for choosing priority areas", attached to 
the Model Directive of 7 May 1985 and aimed at explaining its 
intended scopel7, mentions mainly regulatory criteria. In princi-
ple, the new approach will be appropriate only where it is gen-
uinely possible to distinguish between "essential requirements" 
and "manufacturing specifications" where the requirements for 
protecting safety make "inclusion of large numbers of manufac-
turing specifications" unnecessary18, and where, as with many 
"engineering products and building materials" not yet covered by 
Comrnunity regulations, essential safety requirements can be de-
fined for a "wide range of products". Tue Commission White Pa-
per19 sets the rather legislative criteria of the Model Directive in a 
more ambitious integration policy context. The legislative tech-
nique of reference to standards is assigned far-reaching functions: 
it is to enable the Community to create an expanding and flexible 
intemal market, to increase the competitivity and innovative ca-
pacity of European industry and promote the introduction of new 
technologies. If the regulatory technique of the new approach is 
to be understood from the viewpoint of the ambitious policy per-
spectives of the White Paper, then law approximation projects 
brought in will be oriented towards industrial policy priorities. 
16 Chapter VI, 3.3 infra. 
17 Op. cit. (note 13), 8-9. 
18 In this connection see the Commission communication to the Council 
and the European Parliament "Completing the internal market: Com-
munity foodstuffs law", COM (85) 603 final of 8 November 1985, 2. 
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But even where the practice of harmonisation policy is pragmati-
cally oriented towards the chances of implementing harmonisa-
tion measures, tensions between internal market policy and prod-
uct safety policy priorities can be foreseen. For product safety 
policy, the Community has with the "demonstration project on a 
Community accident information system"20 created a mechanism 
which can, by collecting and assessing data on the number and 
severity of accidents, supply (among other things) knowledge 
about hazards arising from consumer goods and therefore con-
tribute to clarifying where safety policy action is needed21. Tue 
discrepancies between internal market priorities and product 
safety policy priorities again bring up a conflict of objectives that 
already marked "traditional" approximation of laws22. The sixth 
recital and Art. 1 (2) of the decision on the demonstration project, 
at the same time show a way that would at least allow this con-
flict of objectives to be dealt with: findings of accident research 
should be used in defining safety objectives and drawing up stan-
dards. This might be done by, for instance, carrying out in-depth 
studies on product risks preferentially in areas where the Com-
mission has ordered a new standard or in which it has been pre-
sented with objections regarding the safety conformity of stan-
dards or certifications. This kind of feedback would of course as-
sume that the Commission and the Standing Committee already 
set up by the Information Directive of 28 March 198323, and now 
entrusted also with the co-ordination tasks connected with the 
19 Completing the intemal rnarket, Luxernbourg 1985, point 60 et seq. 
20 OJ L 109, 26 April 1986, 23; cf. Chapter IV, 3.3 supra. 
21 Cf. Chapter 1, 1, and Chapter II, 4.2. 
22 Cf. Chapter Ill, 1.1 supra. 
23 0J L 109, 26 April 1983, 8 (Art. 5). 
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new standardisation policy24, would co-operate with the com-
mittees active in the area of product safety policy25. 
3. The primacy claim in the new approach and Mem-
ber States' safety interests 
Even assuming the admissibility in Community law of ref-
erence to standards26, this does not mean that applicability of this 
regulatory technique is guaranteed. Experience shows that trans-
posing directives into national law is a thomy process that has at 
all stages, from incorporation of the directives into national leg-
islative acts up to judicial and administrative practice in Member 
States, to come to grips with varied resistance27. In the case of the 
new approach to technical harmonisation and standards, a regu-
latory technique justified on intemal market policy considerations 
and unfamiliar to many Member States is to be additionally 
pushed through against other legal traditions and political de-
mands28. Even now, a whole range of lines of resistance on safety 
grounds can be discemed. 
24 Cf. Chapter IV, 3.6 supra. 
25 Cf. apan from the Advisory Committee pursuant to An. 7 of the deci-
sion on a demonstration project (note 20) also An. 7 of the decision of 
2 March 1984 on the exchange of information on hazards arising with 
the use products (note 10). 
26 Cf. Chapter IV, 5 supra. 
27 This has been shown frequently and in detail: cf. only Eiden, Recht-
sangleichung 1984, 76 et seq. 
28 Note 13 supra; cf. also Chapter m, 1.1 supra. 
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3.1 Conflict potential 
Following the model of the Low Voltage Directive of 19 
February 197329, directives adopted on the basis of the new ap-
proach are to secure füll harmonisation of the areas and types of 
risks covered30. They are therefore tobe "directly effective", have 
primacy over contrary national law and "block" legislative activ-
ity. But all these doctrines on the effects of European directives, 
though recognised in principle, may cause considerable difficul-
ties of application in practice. Extension of the doctrine of direct 
effect to directives is a reflection of the shortcomings of transpo-
sition in Member States; the doctrine therefore merely states that 
individuals may appeal against application of national law to the 
anti-Community conduct of the national legislator31. But the ECJ 
has now linked direct effect in favour of individuals with the 
conviction that "the relevant obligation (on the Member States) is 
unconditional and adequately precise"32. Accordingly, in the case 
of the new approach, controversy over the functions of the 
"essential safety requirements"33 can affect the applicability of 
the new directives. If in the future, the Community makes the 
safety objectives sufficiently precise "as to enable the certifica-
tion bodies straight away to certify products as being in confor-
mity, having regard to those requirements in the absence of stan-
dards"34, the chances for the application of European law in-
29 Cf. Chapter IV, 2. 
30 Cf. Section B II 1 of the Model Directive (note 13). 
31 Cf. e.g. ECJ Case 9nO, Judgment of 6 October 1970, ECR [ 1970], 
825{fraunstein Finance Office; Case 33nO, Judgment of 17 December 
1970, ECR [1970] 1213/Italian Ministry of Finance; Case 41n4, 
Judgment of 4 December 1974, ECR [1974] 1337/Home Office; Case 
102n9, Judgment of 6 May 1980, ECR [1980] 1473/Commission v. 
Belgium. A full description of the case law up to 1982 can be found in 
Oldenbourg, 1984, 50 et seq.; on the interpretation of the doctrine of 
direct effect taken as a basis here, see also Karoff, 1984, 659 et seq. 
32 According to the formula in Case 148n8, Judgment of 4 May 1979, 
ECR [1979] 162 at 1642 Ratti; on the more generous tendencies in 
earlier judgments see Karoff, 1984, 663. 
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crease; on the other hand, precise specification of safety objec-
tives makes it harder to secure consensus when adopting new di-
rectives, and weakens the attractiveness of the regulatory tech-
nique to standardisation organisations. 
In applying the doctrine of primacy and blocking effect and 
also in connection with actions for breach of treaty brought by 
the Commission under Arts. 169 and 30 EEC, similar difficulties 
are foreseeable. Tue ECJ has given to understand that primacy of 
European law cannot depend on whether the primary motivation 
was intemal market policy or safety policy35, and it follows frorn 
the judgment in the Cremonini v. Vrankovich case36 that Member 
States must, if they wish to assert their interests, keep to the pro-
cedures provided in the directives. These directives can and 
should, however, provide only a presurnption of safety confor-
mity of products bearing the relevant certifications. Controversy 
on the appropriate level of safety of products is therefore ulti-
rnately tobe decided on the basis of the criteria laid down in the 
directives37. Tue wider the leeway for interpreting objectives left 
in the new directives, the greater the chance for Mernber States to 
secure their safety policy positions in the new procedures, even 
once they have formally transposed a directive. Explosive prob-
lems can continue to arise where a Member State takes additional 
measures to protect safety interests and decisions therefore have 
to be taken on the "blocking effect" of the new approach. Tue 
ECJ decisions in rebus Ratti38 and Grunert39 indicate that the 
Court wishes to base the "blocking effect" of Community law 
33 Cf. Chapter IV, 3.2. 
34 Section B III 1 of the Model Directive (note 13). 
35 Case 148n8, op. cit. (note 31), 1644. 
36 Case 815n9, Judgment of2 December 1980, 3583. 
37 On the procedure see Chapter IV, 3.4 supra, and on the similar situa-
tion with the Low Voltage Directive Chapter IV, 2.3.3 supra. On re-
course to Art. 36 EEC see also Chapter IV, 1.2 supra. 
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primarily on specific contradictions between the content of direc-
tives and Member States' legal provisions, and the ban on leg-
islative action in an area dealt with by the Community assumes 
that the Community has also actually pursued its policy40. This 
again raises the question whether the Community ought not, in 
the interest of applicability of the new approach, to develop a 
more comprehensive product safety policy. 
3.2 Functions of the safeguard clause procedure 
All situations of dispute mentioned ultimately come down to 
the same point, namely whether the regulatory technique of refer-
ence to standards can establish itself not only as a strategy for 
internal market policy but also as a safety policy concept. Tue 
procedural provisions in the Model Directive guarantee that dis-
putes about the European level of product safety can be brought 
in not only "preventively" in determining safety objectives and 
recognising standards and conformity certificates, but also 
"responsively" through subsequent objections to decisions taken 
at the Community level, via the safeguard clause procedure. 
Tue safeguard clause procedure, introduced by the Model 
Directive, bad to go beyond the usual type of safeguard clause, 
given the merely presumptive effects of recognition of standards 
and of conformity certifications. Its function is, though the typi-
cal wording of the safeguard clause may not make this explicit, to 
give Member States possibilities for action in the event of haz-
ards not yet recognised when a Community standard was 
38 Op. cit. (note 32). 
39 Case 88n9, Judgment of 12 June 1980, ECR [1980] 1827. 
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adopted4 '. Tue practice has become that Member States, through 
their representatives on the administrative or regulatory commit-
tees, are being allowed decision-making powers in safeguard 
clause procedures42. Tue Model Directive departs from these ex-
amples in both respects: not only new objections can be consid-
ered in the safeguard clause procedure, but also all findings al-
ready arrived at can be questioned, and the Commission is left 
alone to decide as to the justifiability of any objections43. This 
means that the very difficulties in reaching agreement, the Coun-
cil was to free itself of according to the new approach, rnust un-
der the safeguard clause procedure be solved by the Commission, 
which must undertake the actual fine tuning of product safety 
policy differences among Member States. Even setting aside le-
gal reservations regarding such broad delegation of decision-
making powers to the Commission44, it seems scarcely conceiv-
able that the safeguard clause procedure in the Model Directive 
can be developed into a routine measure with short periods of de-
cision and that Member States will rely on its possibilities for 
protecting their rights. These considerations concem both follow-
up market controls45 and co-operation between the Standing 
Committee and committees at the Community level in the area of 
product safety policy46. 
40 Cf. Waelbroeck, 1982, 548 et seq.; Weiler, 1982, 79 et seq.; Re-
hbinder/Stewart, 1985, 40 et seq. On the corresponding interpretation 
of Art. 36 EEC by the ECJ cf. Chapter IV, 1.2 supra. 
41 Cf. Chapter III, 2.5 supra and Krämer, 1985, para. 246, who describes 
and critlcises the contrary practice in the case of the Directive on cos-
metics (note 9). 
42 Cf. for more Krämer, 1985, para. 236 and Chapter IV, 5.2. 
43 On the more restrictive shape given to the Commission's powers in the 
safeguard clause procedure in the Low Voltage Directive see Chapter 
IV, 2.3.3 supra. 
44 On the objections see Chapter IV, 5.1. 
45 See 4 infra. 
46 Cf. Chapter VI, 3.1. 
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3.3 Majority decisions pursuant to Art. 100 a (4) 
As a preliminary test of the applicability of the reference 
technique of the new approach to Member States' product safety 
Iaw, we may take the power given to Member States, following 
ratification of the Single European Act47, by Art. 100 a (4) to ap-
ply their own safety law as apposed to harmonisation measures 
adopted only by qualified majority. Tue Commission can pre-
sume "arbitrary discrimination" or "disguised restraint of trade" 
pursuant to Art. 100 (4 ), second sentence, and the ECJ establish 
misuse of the rigbts under Art. 100 a (4), first sentence, pursuant 
to Art. 100 a (4), third sentence, only where the Community reg-
ulations in fact take account of Member States' interests in pro-
tection. Harmonisation measures decided by qualified majority 
must therefore apply the relatively highest standard if the unity of 
the Common Market is not to be endangered. The Single Euro-
pean Act's provisions on environmental protection may have the 
same effect, in so far as product regulations simultaneously take 
account of environmental and consumer policy interests. By Art. 
130 t, Member States may take more stringent protective mea-
sures even where the Council has decided unanimously, as Iong 
as the measures are "compatible with the Treaty". 
Controversies as to the meaning of Art. 100 a (4) will seem 
hypothetical only when assuming that only outvoted Member 
States may assert their rights arising out of this provision48, and 
that at any rate, in the case of directives Iaying down only essen-
tial safety requirements, the unanimity principle will de facto not 
be deviated from. Irrespective of this, however, it is possible to 
link systematic conclusions with Art. 100 a (4). If even qualified 
47 Bull. EEC, Suppl. 2/86; cf. Chapter IV, 4 supra. 
48 However, see Chapter IV, 4.1 supra. 
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majority decisions of the Council do not bind Member States, or 
only to a very limited extent, how are the Commission's sole 
rights of decision under the safeguard clause procedure to be jus-
tified? Such objections can be refuted only with the argument that 
Art. 100 a (4) is a special arrangement, not in itself compatible 
with the supranational structures of Community law, which does 
not change the binding effect of directives adopted pursuant to 
Art. 100 (1) EEC, and leaves the Council's powers of delegation 
pursuant to Art. 155, fourth indent, EEC unaffected. In its deci-
sion-making practice, the Cornmission will nevertheless not be 
able to avoid taking account of the sensitivity of Member States 
to interventions in their safety law on grounds of intemal market 
policy, expressed in Art. 100 a (4). 
3.4 Compliance with standards 
Probably the most problematic aspects of the reference to 
standards, favoured by the Model Directive as a regulatory in-
strurnent for safety policy, arise from the difficulties of imposing 
standards that are not legally binding. A comparison with the 
move from mandatory to voluntary standards in the US is in-
structive. Tue American Consumer Product Safety Commission 
plays an active part in developing voluntary safety standards; it 
pays attention to their effects on competition, to the involvement 
of consumer organisations in standardisation procedures, and 
verifies the content of standards produced and compliance with 
them49. Tue Model Directive and the agreement between the 
Commission and the European standards organisations admit-
tedly contain a number of procedural guarantees (in part still in 
need of precise specification)50. But the only preventive control 
49 Cf. Chapter II, 4.4. 
50 Cf. Chapter IV, 3.5 supra and Section 6 infra. 
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mechanisms the Commission can use to affect actual compliance 
with standards are the recognition procedures for standards and 
for conformity certificates; it can affect the practice of national 
certification centres only indirectly through the provisions con-
tained in the directives or proposals for directives on simple pres-
sure vessels, toys and construction products5l. These limited pos-
sibilities of influence are in line with the intemal market policy 
perspectives of the new approach, according to which the point is 
to ensure free movement of goods in the Community, so that 
what matters is only the equivalence of standards and conformity 
certificates recognised by the Community. But this internal mar-
ket policy perspective neglects the decisive question from the 
product safety policy viewpoint, namely how a move to voluntary 
standards can be combined with actual guarantees of safety inter-
ests. 
4. Regulatory lacunae in the Model Directive in the 
case of emergency measures and follow-up market 
controls 
Tue Model directives and the directives or proposals for di-
rectives on simple pressure vessels, toys and construction prod-
ucts explicitly recognise Member States' power to take directly 
effective measures in the interests of protecting safety52. A Mem-
ber State that takes advantage of this possibility has to have re-
course to the safeguard clause procedure. But the legally critical 
cases are not those where a Member State loses, since then it 
must accept the Commission decision, but instead the Commis-
51 For more details see Chapter IV, 3.3.2 supra. Funhennore, on the lacu-
nae in protection that may result from diverging cenification practices, 
see the opinion of the Consumer Advisory Committee of 22 March 
1985, STOn/85, 5. 
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sion's possibility of imposing measures it finds justified Europe-
wide on the Member States. 
The pressure for action arising in such cases is irresistible, 
for both economic and legal policy reasons. Unilateral measures 
by a Member State encroach on the unity of the intemal market 
which is the very point of the new hannonisation policy. Unilat-
eral measures are, moreover, admissible only in accordance with 
the safety objectives of directives. Where the Commission has 
found such measures to be legally justified, this implicitly means 
that Member States that do not share the Commission's interpre-
tation and do not follow the measures it recommends are disre-
garding the product safety duty under Community law. 
The Model Directive's laconic fonnulation that the Commis-
sion has to "remind" such Member States of their duty to act53 in 
no way guarantees, even if taken over into individual directives54, 
a uniform application of follow-up market controls within the 
Community. In the case of such controls, Member States apply 
administrative powers that the Community can influence only in-
directly55. As with mutual recognition of administrative acts in 
general and of national conformity certificates in parti cular56, the 
Community must seek to bring about uniform practice by Mem-
ber States in follow-up market control. 
The more recent relevant directives or proposals for direc-
tives have in principle taken account of this perception. Tue pro-
posal for a Directive on "products which, appearing to be other 
52 For details see Chapter IV, 3.4 supra. 
53 Section B VII 2 of the Model Directive (note 13). 
54 In the Directive on simple pressure vessels (note 14, Art. 7) not even 
this was done; cf. Chapter IV, 3.4. 
55 Specifically on technical safety law see Seidel, 1971, 753 et seq. andin 
general Rengeling, 1977, 19 et seq. 25 et seq. 
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than they are, endanger the health or safety of consumers"57 had 
provided for implementation of a Community-wide prohibition 
(Art. 2), obligations on Member States to apply such bans (Art. 3) 
and provisions for Europeanising nationally decided bans (Arts. 4 
and 6). However, the since adopted directive58 Jacks these provi-
sions, as does the Directive on simple pressure vesseJs59. Tue Di-
rective of 1 December 1986 on airbome noise emitted by house-
hold appliances60 differentiates in the monitoring of national de-
cisions between objections by Member States to European stan-
dards and disputes as to national standards and regulations (Art. 
9); this differentiation shows what resistance the Europeanisation 
of control measures has to reckon with even when "only" the en-
forcement of Community provisions is involved61. The proposal 
for a Directive on toys62, finally, must, in addition to provisions 
on bans and recalls (Art. 7 (1), first sentence) and on Europeani-
sation of such decisions by Member States (Art. 7 (1), second 
sentence, (2) - (4)), contain criteria for the recognition of na-
tional test centres (Annex III). The <langer of "subsequent" split-
ting of the common market through single-handed administrative 
action in implementation of Community regulations can be op-
posed by the Commission only if it moves to bring about inten-
sive co-operation among competent centres in Member States and 
in the Community. 
From all this, the recall issue provides the plainest proof that 
realisation of the European intemal market must involve Euro-
peanisation of product safety law. Tue more decisively the Com-
56 Cf. Chapter IV, 3.3 supra. 
57 OJ C 272, 28 October 1986, 10. 
58 Op. cit. (note 14), Art. 4. 
59 Cf. note 53. 
60 OJ L 344, 6 December 1986, 24. 
61 On the question ofthe differentiations in Art. 9 see Chapter IV, 5.3. 
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munity applies the conditions for the free marketability of prod-
ucts by making product safety obligations uniform, the more 
pressing becomes the need to harmonise control measures 
whereby Member States comply with these duties. We shall re-
turn to the practical consequences of these connections63. 
5. Reference to standards and product liability 
For product liability in accordance with the Directive of 25 
July 198564, the new harmonisation policy is not of direct legal 
importance. Tue legal liability duty of product safety in Art. 6 of 
the Directive is to be interpreted autonomously by the civil 
courts. lt will neither be tightened up nor slackened off through 
the product safety obligations of new directives. Tue European or 
national standards a manufacturer must comply with in order to 
market his products do not exclude liability in civil law pursuant 
to Art. 7 d of the Directive. Nor is this "state of science and tech-
nology" which by Art. 7 e limits manufacturer liability, identical 
with the state of European and national standards65. 
Tue legal independence of product liability and product reg-
ulation does not, however, in any way rule out de facto mutual in-
fluence, which can indirectly have considerable legal effects. 
American law provides the clearest example of this, as being the 
furthest developed both in the area of product liability and in that 
of standard setting by federal agencies. Thus, detailed concepts 
for taking safety aspects into account in product planning have 
been extrapolated from the exhaustive case law on design 
62 Note 15 supra. 
63 Chapter VI, 3.4. 
64 OJ L 210, 7 August 1985, 29. 
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faults66. lt is indisputable that product liability procedures offer 
information of relevance not only legally but also technically, 
which can be used by Govemment agencies67, standardisation 
organisations and individual firms. Admittedly, empirical studies 
have shown that while firms react to the excessive damages im-
posed under American law, these reactions concentrate often on 
developing strategies to deal with damage suits68. Standardisation 
organisations seem neither ready nor able to make use of the dy-
namic development of product liability systematically in their 
work69. Conversely, both the standards set by federal agencies 
and voluntary standards of the standardisation organisations play 
a considerable part in product liability actions, both to establish 
the state of the art and to demonstrate technically feasible alter-
natives 70. Comparably intensive interactions between product li-
ability law and product safety law are unknown in Community 
Member States71 and cannot be expected even after the Product 
Liability Directive is converted into national law72. Nevertheless, 
directed measures to increase the degree of effectiveness of the 
Product Liability Directive for European product safety policy 
are entirely conceivable. Thus, systematic exploitation of the case 
Iaw and of documents of relevant actions in Member States could 
clarify whether the safety law demonstrated by European con-
formity certifications is accepted or whether the case law is ques-
65 Cf. Chapter III, 3.5. 
66 Weinstein/fwerski/Piehler/Donaher, 1978, esp. 136 et seq. 
67 Cf. Chapter II, 4.2 in note 57. 
68 Eads/Reuter, 1983, VIII et seq., 21 et seq., 24 et seq., 69 et seq„ 92 et 
seq„ cf. Chapter 1, 3. 
69 Cf. Johnson, 1982. 
70 For a systematic evaluation of the American case law in this connec-
tion see Hoffman/Hoffman, 1980-81, 283 et seq.; cf. also Chapter II, 
4.4.3. 
71 The German debate, still the relatively the most fruitful, is confined to 
legal and normative considerations (cf. Chapter II, 3.5; about France 
cf. Chapter II, 1.6, and England Chapter II, 2. 7). 
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tioning the integrative objectives of the new approach through 
autonomous and/or divergent safety requirements. lt is, however, 
equally conceivable to use them in the Europeanisation of stan-
dards, in the procedures for recognition of standards and confor-
mity certificates and finally in the carrying out of recall actions. 
6. Involvement of consumers in technical standardis-
ation 
Tue new approach to technical standardisation confers on 
the European standardisation organisations CEN/CENELEC the 
task of defining the European safety standards, or de facto "the 
European level of safety", on the basis of defined safety objec-
tives whicb bave to be converted into specific mandates. Tue pri-
vatisation of the law-making process goes band in band with the 
opening up of the standardisation procedure for interested circles, 
including consumers. Consumer involvement is aimed at pro-
viding democratic legitimacy for the new regulatory approach 73. 
Participation can only succeed wbere the consumer interest is 
brougbt in to actual standardisation. Tue organisation of tbis in-
volvement thus stands in tbe centre of interest. However, con-
ceptual and organisational weaknesses of consumer involvement 
suggest a rather pessimistic view regarding the attainment of the 
ambitious goal. Conversely, it would be false to draw the conclu-
sion from foreseeable difficulties, wbicb are perbaps removable 
only conditionally, that consumer involvement at tbe Community 
level should be rejected. For the possibilities that have been 
opened up offer cbances to influence the standard-setting process 
72 Cf. Chapter Ill, 3.5. 
73 Micklitz, Produktsicherheit 1986, 109 et seq. The question was dis-
cussed on 4/5 June 1987 at a meeting of the Community's "European 
Forum on Consumer and European Standardisation", cf. Bosserhoff, 
1987, Europäisches Forum. 
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tliat did not previously exist. Consumer involvement has to live 
with the constant dilemma of on the one hand, being measured 
against expectations it can perhaps never meet, and therefore al-
ways with an alibi at hand, and on the other, of grasping the op-
portunities offered, however limited the resources might be. 
6.1 Basic questions of consumer involvement 
Consumer involvement in standardisation has existed in 
some Member States, such as the Federal Republic of Germany, 
France and Britain for several decades74 . Without seeking to de-
fine the exact starting point for consumer involvement75, all three 
countries have points in common which take on importance in as-
sessing consumer involvement under the new approach. All three 
have in the course of the consumers' movement, intensified in-
volvement in the 1970's, and all three are at the same time, the 
only countries in the European Community that have "organised" 
involvement, namely the DIN Consumer CounciF6, the AFNOR 
Consultative Committee and the Consumer Advisory Committee. 
Studies on whether the opening up of the procedure to consumers 
has led to different contents for standards are not available. Tue 
only study on consumer involvement so far was done in the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany77. Questions to groups involved in 
74 Survey in Lukes, 1979, 48 et seq. (France), 123 et seq. (Great Britain); 
see also Reich/Micklitz, 1981, 99 et seq.; Bosma, 1984, 34 et seq. 
75 In France, consumers were included following the first major restruc-
turing of standardisation during the Second World War, see Chapter II, 
1 supra; specifically on consumer involvement, Art. 5 of the decree of 
24 May 1941, printed in Gennon/Marano, 1982, 111. In Britain the 
Advisory Committee was set up in 1946; see Bosma, 1984, 41. On 
consumer involvement in DIN see Brinkmann, 1976, and Chapter II, 
3.4.5 supra. 
76 On the work of the Consumer Council see Bosserhoff, 1980, 670 et 
seq.; idem, 1984, 1 et seq.; cf. also Chapter II, 3.4.5 supra. 
77 See Schatz, 1984, 178 et seq. 
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standardisation - industry, government and consumers - indi-
cated a basically positive self-image. Tue consumer involvement 
was felt to have led to a change in the content of standards. Nev-
ertheless, the authors diagnose structural defects that must be re-
moved. 
6.1.1 Privatisation and participation 
In its agreement on co-operation with CEN/CENELEC78, 
the Commission transferred the co-operation between State and 
business begun with the agreement between DIN and the German 
Govemment, to a European level79. Since the Community is not a 
State and since CEN/CENELEC merely brings together the na-
tional standards organisations, specific Community problems 
arise about which there is no experience at the national level. 
While the Commission is by Council Decision of 16 July 198480 
formally legitimated to reach agreement with standardisation or-
ganisations, it cannot conclude any legally binding agreements 
providing for delegation of Community powers to private stan-
dardisation organisations, since this is not provided for by the 
Rome treaties. Tue "general guidelines on co-operation" were 
therefore arrived at, and could de facto develop the same legal 
quality as an international treaty or a "memorandum of agree-
ment"81. CEN/CENELEC are being asked to do too much in ap-
plying the general guidelines, since the representatives of the Eu-
ropean economy in fact are not members82. Specifically, the 
question arises whether consumer involvement should be brought 
78 Printed in DIN-Mitt. 64 (1985), 78 et seq. 
79 Micklitz, Perspectives, 1984, published in a revised version in CMLR 
23 (1986), 617 (621 et seq.). 
80 Printed in DIN-Mitt. 63 (1984), 681. 
81 See Chapter II, 2.6 supra. 
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about through national contributions in the CEN/CENELEC 
standardisation committees or at the European level, through the 
already existing European consumer organisations. 
Tue general guidelines contain no specifications in this re-
gard. All that is stated is that "the Commission will, when appro-
priate, contribute to the establishment of suitable arrangements". 
But the agreement between the German Govemment and DIN83 
does not contain any provisions on involvement of interested cir-
cles either. In para. l (2) DIN merely undertakes to take the pub-
lic interest into account. It is only the notes that make it clear that 
this provisions is among other things aimed at an increase of con-
sumer protection in standardisation84. 
What the new forms of co-operation at the national and Eu-
ropean level have in common is not only that the functional dele-
gation of legislative powers is bound up with the decision not to 
set substantive regulations85, here in connection with consumer 
safety and health, but that the opening up of the procedure to 
particular interested circles (consumers) is not bound up with any 
formally guaranteed rights86. Tue "suitable arrangements" men-
tioned in the general guidelines are worked out in a procedure 
82 On the prospects for this sort ofrestructuring see Reihlen, 1984, 7. 
83 Printed in DIN-Normenheft 10, Grundlagen der Normungsarbeit des 
DIN, 1982, 49 et seq.; for more details in the agreement between DIN 
and the Federal Government of Germany see Chapter II, 3.4.2 supra. 
84 Grundlagen der Normungsarbeit des DIN (op. cit. note 80), 54. 
85 On the function of reference to standards in the GSG see Chapter II, 3 
supra and on safety objectives under the new approach Chapter IV, 3.2 
supra. 
86 In the Federal Republic of Germany procedural rights were laid down 
following the standards agreement when settii1g up the DIN Consumer 
Council, which leads Bopp-Schmehl/ Heibült/Kypke, 1983, 172 et seq. 
to make the following statement: "The demonstration that this function 
has been carried out did not follow substantive criteria of assessment of 
standards, but compliance with particular procedural rules ... " Con-
versely it should be borne in mind that the standards agreement could 
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that involves only the Community administration and the stan-
dards organisations (CEN/CENELEC). Those whose right to 
speak is at stake may be heard, to be sure, but have a weak posi-
tion in the negotiating process. What requirements can be de-
duced from "real involvement" and from support from the Com-
mission "as appropriate" for the establishment of "suitable ar-
rangements"? That sequence of phrases shows the openness of a 
process, the object of which is no less than the legitimisation of 
the new approach. 
On 11 December 1987, the Commission took an official po-
sition on consumer involvement in standardisation87. lt pressed 
for strengthening of consumer participation at the national level, 
in order to ensure that consumer interests could be input into the 
position of national representations on CEN/CENELEC. What 
the way forward is to be at a European level, is on the other hand 
left open. Tue Commission wishes to arrive at "an agreement 
with CEN/CENELEC on a new way of working". Whatever this 
may mean, institutionally solid consumer participation does not 
at any rate seem tobe within immediate grasp. One year later on 
4 November 1988, the Council confirmed the Commission's po-
sition by enhancing the necessity to push for an effective con-
sumer participation at the Member States level and by weakening 
consumer participation at the Community level88. Tue conclusion 
of an "agreement" is no longer mentioned; instead reference is 
made to a priority programme for consumer fairs and to seminars 
that should be held to increase the consumer input in standardisa-
tion. 
Involvement understood in this way, without substantive 
provisions and without procedural guarantees, cannot remain 
not have been concluded before the parties had agreed on consumer in-
volvement. 
87 COM(87)617 final, 11December1987. 
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without consequences for the consumer input to standards. For if 
the conditions of consumer involvement are partly determined by 
the standards organisations, the obvious thing to do is channel the 
consumer interests in standardisation in accordance with the cri-
teria set by business of the proportionality of consumer repre-
sentatives, the technical relevance of their contributions and fea-
sibility89, in order to exclude alternative (non-professional as be-
ing lay, non-technical as being sociological, and non-feasible as 
being economically expensive) product concepts from standardi-
sation90. The whole of consumer protection thus becomes subor-
dinated to the existing goals of standardisation and can be 
brought about only in a piggyback procedure unless other vehi-
cles can be found, in other words, unless the goal is necessary for 
other reasons than those of health or safety protection. In this 
way, safety policy becomes integrated into intemal market pol-
icy. Alternative product concepts, humanised technology as the 
object of product safety law, are placed institutionally under a 
constraint to provide justification. Safety objectives that go be-
yond the "generally accepted state of the art" will be accepted 
only where consumers can show that existing practice has led to 
severe accidents. This sets the framework for consumer involve-
ment in private standardisation. Privatisation does by no means 
ensure true participation. 
6.1 .2 The consumer interest in standardisation91 
Consumers want better products, safer products. Consumer 
demands regularly lengthen the manufacturer's proceedings. They 
call for a little "more" than the manufacturers are prepared to 
88 OJ No. C 293, 1, 17 November 1988. 
89 Convincingly, Kypke, 1983, 213. 
90 See Brüggemeier/Falke/Holch-Treu/Joerges/Micklitz, 1984, 8 et seq. 
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give. This is in line with the institutional framework for con-
sumer involvement. Separate product concepts, in order to avoid 
the word "alternative", could be brought about only in an offeror 
process92, but not as an appendix to standardisation oriented to-
wards the needs of business. Tue slight experience with the 
American offeror process has at any rate shown that consumers 
can if given the chance, arrive at their own conceptions of prod-
uct safety. In Community Member States, there have not been 
many attempts as yet to develop technical standards from the 
consumer's "own" point of view. Even differentiated models of 
the determination of the consumer interest concentrate on the 
manufacturer's perspectives and seek to load their position with 
consumer policy significance. 
Bosma93 has dealt comprehensively with the issue. She de-
mands that an adequate consumer orientation in standards answer 
three questions: 
(1) Should the final consumer be directly involved in standardi-
sation, and if so, how can such a commitment effectively be 
organised? Who can adequately represent the consumer, or 
also, who speaks "for" the consumer in the relevant bodies? 
(2) Where is the necessary scientific background to come from 
for choosing priorities that take account of individual 
households or society as a whole? 
(3) Where is the necessary scientific mechanism to come from 
in order to analyse the needs, wishes and behaviour of indi-
vidual consumers? 
In order to arrive at an answer on the basis of these 
three questions, Bosma splits consumer interest into 
three cate&ories94: consumer interest and rnarketing, 
consumer mterest and product technology, consumer 
91 See Bosma, 1984, 16 et seq. 
92 Chapter II, 4.1.2.2 supra. 
93 As well as Bosma, 1984, 16 et seq., see Bosma, 1985, 9 et seq. 
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interest and product information. Bosma includes un-
der marketing, among other things, requirements on 
consideration of foreseeable misuse in design, but also 
for possible recall or else liability in the event of prod-
uct defectiveness95. Consumer requirements on product 
technology would be expressed through the require-
ment for a technology assessment (especially with new 
technologies), an estimate of the social consequences 
of the introduction of new or modified products and a 
quality assessment by the relevant testing agencies96. 
Tue interest in adequate product information is stated 
to require provision of special safety marks97. 
This ambitious concept of determination of the con-
sumer interest is, in Bosma's view, demanding too 
much from the individual consumer98. Tue latter, often 
unsure or even unaware of their wishes, far less being 
in a position to set priorities, would have to be repre-
sented on the relevant bodies by experts. Bosma does 
not fail to see the problems facing realisation of this 
kind of concept, but feels that an intensive process of 
scientific study (processing of surveys, etc.)99 could 
permit adequate establishment of a consumer interest 
in standardisation. 
lt would be attractive to differentiate the model proposed 
still further or even develop it towards an alternative consumer 
concept of consumers themselves. lt is attractive because the pro-
posed categories for including sociological findings as to the be-
haviour of consumers, the acceptance of environmental technolo-
gies, etc. are very inviting. Tue job is valuable and necessary and 
should be done, but there are a number of structural problems that 
should be bome in mind. Tue concept does not so far take ac-
count of the specific conditions for determining the consumer 
94 Bosma, 1984, 17, 19, 22. 
95 Op. cit., 18. 
96 Op. cit., 20-21; similar considerations by Venables, 1982. 
97 Bosma, 1984, 23. 
98 Op. cit., 25. 
99 Bosma, 1985, 9. 
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interest at a European level. At a national Jevel it is hard to de-
termine "the" consumer interest. At the European level differ-
ences in familiarity with technical dangers also enter in to com-
plicate the matter further, as well as differences in technical solu-
tions to deal with the danger. These social and technical differ-
ences have led to different safety philosophies in the Community 
which now have to be combined within the standards organisa-
tions. Consumers are afraid, and can cite examples, that stan-
dardisation oriented towards creation of an intemal market will 
Jead to a reduction in the level of safety'oo. Though effective con-
sumer involvement might help to avert this risk, there should still 
be consideration of whether it is all desirable to make the various 
safety philosophies in the Member States uniform. Thinking by 
both political and technical bodies is only at its outset. Already, 
however, it can be seen that work in standardisation bodies does 
not aim at levelling out differing safety philosophies and regula-
tory approaches, but wishes to Jet them continue to co-exist101 • 
Another thing that seems problematic from the European 
viewpoint is the scientific presentation of consumer participation 
favoured by Bosma. In a European organisation of consumer in-
volvement this would lead to a predominance of the industrial 
countries, Germany, France, and Britain, while southem Euro-
pean countries, with their experiences of handling technology, 
would be excludedl02. Tue opening up of the prospect reveals the 
intemal contradictoriness of the idea of making consumer in-
volvement scientific. Consumer organisations have to meet the 
requirements on professionality in standardisation bodies; this is 
the only way they can stand up to argument. At the same time, 
this necessity cuts them off from their rank and file, since con-
100 Bosma, 1984, 12. 
101 On this see 6.3.3 infra. 
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sumer organisations in developed industrial countries also derive 
their body of experience from sources that do not meet scientific 
demand, or do so only in part. Tue tendency to emphasise the sci-
entific aspects of consumer imvolvement may in the long term af-
fect the very foundations of consumer work, and lead in Ger-
many, France and Britain to more technology-oriented consumer 
advice, but at the European level the differences are liable to 
continue for quite some time. What should be done therefore is to 
develop a model that does not rule out non-professional experi-
ence, particularly in the southem European countries, in handling 
technology, but includes it in an integrated concept of involve-
ment in standardisation. 
6.1.3 Chances of consumer invo/vement 
In view of the multiplicity of tasks assigned to European 
consumer involvernent in standardisation, the question arises as 
to where consumer are to gain the ability to do the job in sub-
stantive tenns. Questionnaires to national consumer representa-
tions in standardisation organisations in European Community 
Member States have recently confirmed what was no surprise: 
even at national levels, there is a shortage of experts and of the 
requisite financial resourcesI03. Experts are likely tobe available 
in significant quantity only if consumer organisations have more 
recourse to technicians in their field work. But this would lead to 
a fundamental restructuring of the direct contact between organi-
sations and consumers. Consumer organisations are traditionally 
concemed with personal product consultancy. Tue use of new 
media promises a considerable lightening of the burden, but at 
102 At the same time the non-inclusion of southern European countries in 
the decision-making process was used as an argument against the ad-
mission of consumer observers; see 6.3.1 infra. 
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the same time tends to lead to conflicts among organisations. 
Ecotrophologists would be replaced by technicians who not only 
handle media control product consultancy, but also a wide of 
complaints 104.0nly such a step can create the conditions for 
gradually increasing the number of experts, yet even this kind of 
restructuring cannot solve the financial problems of consumer or-
ganisations. Effective consumer involvement in standardisation 
will always remain dependent on governmental subsidies. 
Tue present standardisation problems arising from consumer 
involvement have been summarised by the DIN Consumer Advi-
sory Council's office in a manual'05. Honorary work on behalf of 
consumers in standardisation committees continually impinges 
on the recurrent structural pattem of "reasons for standardisation 
- person - object of standardisation - asserting of interest". In 
detail: 
"Whether there are grounds for standardisation is de-
cided ultimately by the manufacturers. Consumers are 
therefore dependent on the goodwill of the other side if 
they wish to encourage standardisation of a particular 
product. Tue situation looks somewhat brighter in the 
area of safety standards, since the Appliances Safety 
Act has given consumers the necessary impetus to push 
safety standardisation forward. For this very reason, 
there is a need to press at the European level for 
stronger obligations on manufacturers, importers and 
traders to market only safe products'06. Even inside 
safety standards, consumer representatives ought to 
take priority decisions in order to make it possible to 
find a standardisation project that will pay. lt is in this 
103 Bosl?a, .1984, 34 et .seq. carried out a survey of those involved in star-
dard1sat10n and contmually came to the same findings. 
104 On such considerations see Micklitz, 1985, 177 et seq. 
105 Printed in Bosserhoff, 1984, 7 et seq. 
106 See Chapter VI, 3.3 infra. 
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very decision that the scarcity of resources comes into 
play. 
Tue manual then sets out clearly the compromises that 
the DIN Consumer Council has to engage in so as even 
to find consumer representatives that would commit 
themselves to standardisation work. Accordingly, the 
DIN Consumer Council has even accepted people not 
employed in a consumer institution. The principle ap-
plied is that people must have sufficient technical 
knowledge, which is not to be understood as actual 
specialisation, be motivated, be legitimated to speak on 
behalf of consumers and be able to defend their posi-
tion in DIN working committees. 
Tue requirements for the person in each case depend 
quite largely on the object of standardisation. How-
ever, consumer representatives rarely get beyond the 
position of "informed laymen", measured by the stan-
dards of the other side. In order to meet the require-
rnents on the professionality of contributions, the man-
ual provides methodological indications for working 
out a consumer standpoint. If the problem is localised 
(safety, health), consumer protection objectives have to 
be defined in detail. Consumer represencatives should 
have recourse here to complaints, accident statistics, 
tests of goods, etc. Particular difficulties face con-
sumers when it comes to determining the actual level 
of safety. This is where the shortcomings of making 
things scientific become particularly clear. For empiri-
cal studies and scientific assessments are often re-
placed by mere exchange of experience, reference to 
test reports or comparable standards from other coun-
tries. If the grounds for standardisation are present, the 
right people found and the object for standardisation 
specified, the question still arises as to how the con-
sumer side is to assert its position in the relevant com-
mittees. 
Experience in DIN confirms the need to utilise the procedu-
ral rights formally allowed to the füll. Tue DIN manual could act 
as a model for working out procedural guarantees at the European 
level. 
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Experience with consumer involvement at a national level 
and the structural problems of consumer involvement pointed out 
by the DIN Consumer Council suggest the conclusion that the 
chances for European consumer involvement should be regarded 
rather skeptically. If experts are lacking even at anational level, 
where are they to be found at a European level? Tue financial 
problems are considerably increased by high travel costs. Tue 
structural problems of consumer involvement diagnosed in the 
DIN manual must each be increased by the dimension of co-ordi-
nating consumer interests Europe-wide so that at every level -
reason for standardisation, person, object of standardisation, 
strategies to follow - mechanisms have to be provided to ensure 
that national consumer interests are reconciled. Nevertheless, it 
would be over-hasty to deny consumer involvement in European 
standardisation work any prospect of success a priori. European 
involvement at the same time offers consumers chances to assert 
their interests that cannot be found in the same way at a national 
level. A decisive step in this direction would be to break into the 
organisational structure of CEN/CENELEC by involving Euro-
pean consumer organisations in the standardisation process. This 
kind of direct influence from the European angle would give con-
sumers something of an edge over business, which must first co-
ordinate its interests through national organisations. Moreover, 
consumer involvement ought not to be incorporated in the or-
ganisational structure CEN/CENELEC but just the contrary: it 
should be established independently of standardisation organisa-
tions. This very trend has been emerging recentJy107. 
But the institutional advantages can be fully utilised by con-
sumer representatives at the European level only if they divide up 
tasks and capacities and concentrate their forces on putting the 
resources of the twelve Member States to their best advantage. 
107 See 6.2 infra. 
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This means setting up a "professional organisation" of consumer 
representatives at European level, since this is the only way to 
guarantee an adequate definition of the consumer interest in the 
sense of Bosma's idea. This kind of professionally organised con-
sumer involvement should include specific measures in behalf of 
consumers from Southem Europe. 
6.1.4 Consumer access to public information 
Tue chances for effective consumer involvement depend 
largely on the capability of consumer representatives to provide 
and sutain relevant information to their committees. As weil as 
mobilising sources of their own, they will have to depend here on 
access to information compiled either nationally or by Commu-
nity institutions. Tue Commission has now considerably ex-
panded its information policy in product safety standardisation, 
so that direct access by consumer representatives is here of con-
siderable importance. Tue information procedure in the field of 
technical Standards and regulations108 might provide consumer 
representatives in the area of safety standardisation with an 
overview of national differences and at the same time give them 
ideas as to which national safety standard should be favoured as 
the European solutionI09. Tue Community system for rapid ex-
change of information on hazards arising from consumer prod-
uctsI 10 and the Community information system on accidents 
caused by consumer goodslll theoretically create the conditions 
108 OJ L 109, 26 April 1983, 8 et seq. 
109 On the chances for the information project see Micklitz, Perspectives, 
1984, 33 et seq. 
110 OJ L 70, 13 March 1984, 16 et seq. 
111 OJ L 109, 26 April 1986, 23 et seq. 
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for bringing statistically supported information into the standardi-
sation process. 
In fact, all three projects hinder consumer access to infor-
mation. Tue information procedure in the field of technical Stan-
dards and regulations treats information received as confiden-
tiaJI 12. Tue European consumer representatives have no access to 
the CEN/CENELEC database. At most they can secure informa-
tion from the national consumer representatives on the standardi-
sation organisations. The Community system for rapid exchange 
of information on dangers arising in using consumer goods ex-
cludes the consumer a priori. Where a national authority so de-
sires, information is treated confidentially in justified casesll3. 
Tue accident information system, which is perhaps even more 
important, did not provide for any possibility of using accident 
statistics in standardisation procedures before the end of the 
model project in 1989ll4. This may change, especially if sources 
of danger that suddenly arise call for Community-wide measures. 
lt is. though, very striking that all three projects bar consumers 
from access to information. 
112 Note 108 supra, Art. 8 (4). 
113 Note 110 supra, Art. 6. 
114 Note 111 supra, Art. 8. 
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6.2 The existing organisational structure of consumer in-
volvementll5 
Since December 1982 and April 1983 respectively, the four 
organisations represented on the Consumer Consultative Com-
mittee (CCC) (BEUC, the European Trade Union Conference, the 
Association of Community Family Organisations and the Euro-
pean Community of Consumer Cooperatives) have been sending 
observers to various technical committees of the European stan-
dardisation bodies CEN and CENELEC. This started with thor-
ough discussions between the Commission, CEN and CENELEC 
and the European consumer organisations, conceming the form 
of possible involvement by European consumers. Ultimately, 
those involved agreed to direct collaboration of European con-
sumers in standardisation, although it long seemed as if 
CEN/CENELEC would not be prepared to accept direct involve-
ment since this would mean a break in CEN/CENELEC's organi-
sational structure. Without pressure from the Commission it 
would not have come to direct involvement of European con-
sumer representatives in standardisation. Tue Commission pays 
some of the expenses: its contribution was 60,000 ECU in 1984, 
40,000 in 1985 and 90,000 in 1986. In October 1983 the Com-
mission (DG XI) and BEUC signed an agreement on the in-
volvement of European consumers in European standardisa-
tionII6. 
115 The following Statements are based on two reports drawn up by the 
BEUC for DG XI (now the Consumer Policy Service), to give an ac-
count of the utilisation of contributions: report on the involvement of 
European consumers in European standard1sation, BEUC/2111/84, 26 
October 84 (cited as BEUC, 1984) and report on standardisation, 
STD/20/85, 31December1985 (cited as BEUC, 1985, Report). 
116 Printed in BEUC, 1984, Annex I. 
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6.2./ Consumer Advisory Committee, working group on 
standards and secretariat for co-ordination 
Tue Consumer Consultative Committee (CCC) has for many 
years had a working group on standards that was brought into ne-
gotiations between the Commission and CEN/CENELEC. Tue 
way towards a financing of European consumer involvement by 
the Commission was finally cleared when the four members of 
the CCC agreed to entrust BEUC with the task of eo-ordinating 
European eonsumer involvement. Tue eo-ordination seeretariat is 
formally independent, with BEUC merely providing the institu-
tional framework. 
To give a closer definition of the tasks of the eo-ordination 
seeretariat, it seems helpful to keep the three organisations in-
volved, BEUC (as the contraetual partner of the Commission), 
the CCC and the eo-ordination seeretariat separate. Tue BEUC 
has taken over merely formal eompetence. lt was mandated to: 
eo-ordinate the positions of European national standardisation 
organisations in the area of standardisation; seeure information 
on standardisation from European and national eonsumer organi-
sations and pass it on; pay travel expenses for experts taking part 
in CEN/CENELEC meetings; hold co-ordination meetings on 
standardisation in order to arrive at a common position for Euro-
pean consumers on standardisation questions; provide for eon-
taets between Comrnission offiees, the standardisation organisa-
tions and consumer organisations in order to secure active and ef-
feetive eo-operation of European consumers on questions of Eu-
ropean standardisation; take other measures suitable for eon-
tributing to the efficieney of eonsumer involvement in the work 
of CEN and CENELEC. Similarly, BEUC is obliged to bring in-
terim reports and annual reports before the Commission. De 
facto, however, this work is done not by BEUC, but by an em-
ployee paid by the Commission who direets the co-ordination 
secretariat. 
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Tue CCC's interest is to draw as clear a demarcation line as 
possible between the area of work of the European co-ordination 
secretariat and the work of the CCC working group on stan-
dardsl 11. Tue co-ordination secretariat is to co-ordinate participa-
tion by consumer representatives in CEN/CENELEC (selection, 
appointment, reimbursement of expenses, training, co-ordination) 
and in national standardisation bodies, to give technical support 
to the CCC in its discussions and supply technical reports on spe-
cific topic at the request of Commission offices. The work of the 
working group on standards is to examine the following three 
fields: verification of new Commission initiatives in the area of 
standardisation policy; verification of proposals for directives in 
the area of standardisation and any setting of minimal require-
ments in the area of consumer protection; evaluating the annual 
report of the co-ordination secretariat. In other tenns, the CCC 
working group on Standards formulates policy and the co-ordina-
tion secretariat (BEUC) implements it. Tue working group on 
standards would thus as hitherto, and like the other CCC working 
groups, also prepare opinions for subsequent adoption by the ple-
nary sessions. In addition to policy formulation, the working 
group on standards also wishes to exercise a supervisory function 
over the co-ordination secretariat, which cannot necessary be 
reconciled with the CCC's range of tasks to date. 
6.2.2 Consumer observers on technical committees 
Only representatives of test institutes or members of inde-
pendent research institutes act as consumer observers on the 
technical committees of CEN/CENELEC. Although unofficial, it 
seems to be clear inside the CCC that representatives of con-
sumer committees in national standards organisations can at any 
117 See XI/371/86, 22 May 1986, ccc/17/86 "Beteiligung der Verbraucher 
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rate not act as observersl 18. This does not rule out their inclusion 
as expcrts in co-ordination meetings. However, this prior decision 
by the CCC illustrates a certain skepticism regarding the inde-
pendence of consumer representations institutionally involved in 
national standardisation organisations. The differing perspectives 
of testing and scientific institutions may be decisive here. For 
while consumer representatives on national standardisation Or-
ganisations are supposed to find generally accepted solutions to-
gether with the manufacturers, the testing and scientific institutes 
may take the product standardised into consideration, relatively 
free from such economic pressures. The number of consumer ob-
servers on CEN/CENELEC technical committees has steadily 
risen since work beganII9. In 1984 European consumer repre-
sentatives were sending 4 observers to 9 technical committees. In 
1985 it was 8 observers to 9 committees. Of these, however, only 
four committees were really active in 1985. Of the 58 committees 
in CEN, 8 do not work, 7 involve consumers, while 34 would be 
of interest to them. Of the 34 committees in CENELEC, 3 in-
volve consumers, while 7 would be of interest. This assessment is 
based in a selection according to the following criteriaI20: safety 
considerations, influence of standards on competition, consumer 
information, performance criteria, energy aspects. In fact the pos-
sibilities for European consumer associations to send observers 
are considerably restricted. First of all, one has to find an ob-
server prepared to take the job on. This observer has to provide 
information on the state of work on a particular CEN/CENELEC 
committee, name the most important points for discussion, reflect 
the various standpoints of manufacturers and the national stan-
an den Normungsarbeiten". 
118 BEUC, 19?4, 9 and Annex II (minutes of the meeting on problems of 
consumer 1.nvolvement in European standardisation work of the Con-
sumer Adv1sory Council, BEUC 162/83, 15 November 1983, 6(g)). 
119 ~s "'.eil as the BEUC repon (note 115 supra) see Consumer Participa-
llon m Standards Work, STD/17/86, 15 May 1986. 
120 BEUC, 1984, Annex II (note 118 supra), 6 (f). 
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dardisation organisations, fonn an opinion of his own and above 
all send a report to the co-ordination secretariat after each meet-
ing121. 
To avoid misunderstandings, it would seem appropriate to 
give some further explanations of the number of committees set 
up by CEN/CENELEC. Behind each technical committee there is 
a whole range of products. When European consumer associa-
tions send an observer to TC 61 (safety of household appliances), 
he has to cover the whole product range of electrical appliances 
to be found in the home. Tue gamut runs from washing machines, 
dryers, electric cookers, toasters, refrigerators, freezers, coffee 
mills, clocks and irons to massage appliances, sun-ray lamps and 
sewing machines. And this !ist is by no means complete. A com-
parison with national sets of standards might lead to the conclu-
sion that European standards are much broader in content than 
differentiated national standards. 
6.2.3 Observers' co-ordination meetings 
One of the most important tasks of the Co-ordination Sec-
retariat is to hold co-ordination meeting with consumer observers 
and national consumer experts on the individual committeesI22. 
Since it is incumbent on the consumer observer to represent the 
interests of consumers in individual Member States, he must be 
infonned and advised by national consumer experts in order to be 
able to intervene appropriately in CEN/CENELEC meetings. Ac-
cordingly, the co-ordination meetings are the core of European 
consumer participation. Theoretically, there is an entitlement to 
raise new projects for CEN/CENELEC standardisation through 
the co-ordination meetings. In practice, the co-ordination meet-
121 Op. cit„ 3. 
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ings serve mainly to tackle problems "brought back" by the ob-
server from meetings of the technical committees. The Co-ordi-
nation Secretariat then has the task of drawing up an agenda, 
inviting the experts from the various Member States and dis-
tributing the necessary papers in advance. Since the national ex-
pens' work is honorary, the success of the co-ordination meetings 
depends largely on voluntary commitment by the experts. At the 
same time, the greatest commitment is useless if the infonnation 
flow among national consumer experts is not adequately organ-
ised. 
6.3 Practice to date with consumer participation in 
CEN/CENELEC 
European consumer representatives can now look back on 
two and a half years of practical experience. The reporting duty 
placed upon BEUC by the Cornmission offers a good basis for 
making an initial analysis from an intemal viewpoint. This seems 
all the more important because thinking is at present going on in 
DG XI about how consumer involvement is to be organised in the 
future. 
6.3.1 Procedural questions 
Observers on CEN/CENELEC technical committees meet a 
number of procedural obstacles at the start of their work that do 
not yet seem to have been removed. This annoyance can ulti-
mately be removed only by written procedural guarantees, a con-
122 BEUC, 1984, 4 et seq.; BEUC, 1985, Repon, 14 et seq. 
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clusion that can be confinned from experience with the DIN 
Consumer Counci1I23. 
Tue first appearance of consumer observers on the technical 
committees regularly led to the question of what status the ob-
server ought to have on the technical committesl24. This was 
even though CEN/CENELEC bad infonned the relevant com-
mittees of the inclusion of consumers in standardisation through a 
circular. De facto, the consumer representatives faced the burden 
of justifying why they wanted to take part in the work. 
While these problems were more or less rapidly solved in 
the course of time, much more complex obstacles faced consumer 
representatives when it came to putting forward their position in 
discussion. Two areas proved particularly important: involvement 
in drawing up the agenda and inclusion of consumer positions set 
down in writing in the organised infonnation flow within 
CEN/CENELEC. An example may illustrate this. 
Tue commitment of the consumer representatives on 
the CENELEC Committee on Safety of Household 
Appliances (TC 61) very quickly brought out the need 
to think about the extent to which technical standards 
ought to consider that children are not always under 
supervision (the so-called exclusion clause)I25. At the 
co-ordination meeting in May 1984, the decision was 
taken toset a debate going in TC 61. At the next TC 61 
meeting in June 1984, the Co-ordination Secretariat's 
request was however rejected. Observers had according 
to the Committee Chainnan, no possibility of bringing 
forward a paper in the Technical Committee. Accord-
ing to CENELEC procedural rules this was open only 
to the Secretariat and to national delegations. An ex-
ception might be made for consumer observers if the 
123 6.1.3 supra. 
124 BEUC, 1984, Annex II (note 118 supra), 2. 
125 For details on the substantive issue see 5.3.3 (2). 
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Commission asked CENELEC to consider a corre-
sponding proposaJ126. Despite this unpromising begin-
ning, the Co-ordination Secretariat, at the request of the 
observer, went further into the question. At the January 
1985 co-ordination meeting a letter to the Chairman of 
TC 61 was drafted. Tue next meeting of TC 61 in May 
1985 showed, however, that the paper had not been 
distributed 127. The Co-ordination Secretariat thereupon 
decided to approach the President of TC 61 and urge 
that the letter be distributed. This letter was distributed 
to Committee members, with the agreement of the 
CENELEC Executive Secretary. At the next meeting of 
TC 61 in October 1985, the President then made it 
clear that henceforth be written comments of the con-
sumer observer would automatically passed on to TC 
61 membersi28. Altogether it took more than a year to 
merely secure formal access to the debating forum, 
without a single substantive word having been spent on 
the actual issue. 
More fundamental in nature are the problems arising from 
the weak participation by consumer observers, from only four 
Member States. Tue committees ask observers for legitimation of 
their claim to speak on behalf of the European consumer when 
only four, or even three, consumer delegations out of twelve 
Member States are involved in co-ordinating a consumer stand-
point 129. Tue structural weaknesses are imputed to the consumers 
themselves and additionally the task is imposed on them of 
specifically ensuring inclusion of Southem European countries. 
This position may be used positively as an argument for asking 
126 BEUC, 1984, Annex VIII: Protocol of the rneeting of CENELEC, 
Oslo, 18-22 June 1984. 
127 BEUC, 1985, Report, Annex 1 d: Co-ordination Meeting on Electrical 
Household Appliances TC 61, Brussels, 12 September 1985. 
128 BEUC, 1985, Report, Annex II b: Minutes of the Meeting of CEN-
ELEC TC 61, Athens, 1-3 October 1985. 
129 CCC's observers report on meeting of CEN TC 62 - Gas Convector 
Heaters, London 12-13 March 1986. 
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the Cornmission for suitable financial contributions in order to 
organise this process. 
Tue remaining point is the difficulties that have arisen in the 
case of contracts issued to CEN/CENELEC by the Cornmission. 
With one exceptionBO, consumers have not been included in the 
terms of the contract. And even this one Community measure 
happened more or less by chance, because the European con-
sumer organisations bad been informed of the Cornmission's in-
tention in time. Practical problems with the technical committees 
arose particularly because the remit given by the Commission 
was often so imprecisely worded that the Technical Committee 
saw itself compelled to turn it againl3I. lt should be noted in 
passing that the Commission is g1vmg contracts to 
CEN/CENELEC before safety objectives under the new approach 
have yet been specified. 
6.3.2 Information and co-ordination 
Since consumers are cut off at the European level from 
Community information sources, the need to build up an intemal 
information network and co-ordinate incoming information 
Community-wide takes on even greater importance. Tue impor-
tance of this task was just as clear to the CCC working group on 
standards as it was to BEUC when it set up the Co-ordination 
130 BEUC, 1985, Repon, 19; what is meant is TC 48 Safety of Gas Water 
Heaters, on whicn see Note for file, op. cit., Annex III a. 
131 BEUC, 1985, Report, 11; op. cit., Annex II f: Repon by Mr. Bosser-
hoff on CEN(fC Gas Water Heaters, which seeks to specify the re-
quirements on the wording of terms of reference; Bosserhoff put his 
criticism into practice and drew up a proposal of his own for g1ving a 
Community rernit to CEN(fC 48; op. eil., Annex III b: Resolutions 
taken at the Ist Meeting of CEN(fC 52/WG in Berlin, 1985-09-25/27, 
which lists the shoncomings of the terms of reference in specific form. 
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Secretariat. But thc Co-ordination Secrctariat has neither the fi-
nancial nor staff rcsources to build up this information and co-or-
dination network itsclf. Instead, it is dcpendent on co-operation 
by national experts on co-ordination committees and on their in-
formation sources in their home organisations. 
A clear tendency to professionalisation 132 has emerged, 
which pursues more or less the following course: if an 
observer has been found for a technical committee of 
importance to European consumers, the Co-ordination 
Secretariat assembles the necessary information for an 
evaluation of the committee's work. This is the only 
guarantee that the observer can recognise his possibili-
ties of ~nfluencing the ongoing procedureI33. lf prob-
lems anse in the technical committee, the observer ap-
proaches the Co-ordination Secretariat and asks for the 
calling of a co-ordination meeting. Tue Co-ordination 
Secretariat prepares the meeting, distributes all neces-
sary material and/or asks for it from members of the 
co-ordination meeting. While in the initial stages, the 
members of the co-ordination meeting sought to assess 
the problems arising on the basis of their experience, a 
procedure has now been developed in which one of the 
members undertakes to produce a background paper 
w~ich_, .according to the topic, assesses either specific 
sc1ent1f1c research or ad hoc studies within national 
consumer organisations134. This background paper is 
u~ed .by the observer, following decision in the co-or-
dmau~n meeting, for submission to the technical 
comm1ttee. 
132 Cf. e.g. the minutes of the first co-ordination meeting, BEUC, 1984, 
Annex II (note 118 supra) and of the meeting of 10 June 1986: Minutes 
of the CCC Co-ordination Meeting June 10, 1986. In both meetings a 
number of problem areas were touched on- the later minutes demon-
strate, that consumer viewpoints were voic~d with growing self-confi-
dence. 
133 This had at the outset proved a great obstacle, BEUC, 1984, Annex II 
(note 114 supra) 2. 
134 BEUC, 1985, Repon, Annex VI: STD/12/85, Maximum Surface Tem-
peratures of Heating Appliances by D. Grose, Consumer Association, 
June 1985 and BEUC:, 1985, Repon, Annex VII: STD/33/85 Analysis 
of .. a Survey concermng Electrical Functional Toys by A. Lange -
Stumpfig, DIN-Verbraucherrat, 1985. 
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The intensity of information exchange between the ob-
server and the national representatives or experts in the 
co-ordination committee depends strongly on the ac-
tivities of the technical committee. In other terms, 
CEN/CENELEC determines the rate of the consumer 
work. Besides current information and co-ordination 
needs, the Co-ordination Secretariat has begun a num-
ber of in-depth studies. These serve, on the one hand, 
the objective of proceeding in product-related fashion, 
as was the case with the study by the Consumer Asso-
ciation on the "bicycle market in the Community"I35, 
but also through work directed at making up for short-
comings in knowledge on consumer participation, par-
ticularly in Southem European countriesI36. Attempts 
were also made to provide regular information through 
a newsletter on the state of standardisation workI37. 
However, this proved difficult for two reasons. Firstly, 
due to the small circle of interest, it seemd advantagous 
to incorporate this newsletter into the general BEUC 
journal138, and secondly, this path was blocked because 
the CCC insisted on independence of the Co-ordination 
Secretariat. 
Despite all the tendencies towards professionalisation, so far 
there is no infrastructure intact to which the Secretariat can have 
recourse. Accident studies are not recorded centrally, nor can the 
Secretariat have access to the specific knowledge of safety stan-
dards accumulated particularly in test institutions. The only inter-
nal information network available to date - BEUC InterpoIJ39 -
is not included in the workl40, which would in any case be possi-
135 AGV, Der Fahrradmarkt in der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, 1986. 
136 So far, repons are available on consumer participation in Italy and 
Greece. 
137 The first edition is printed in BEUC, 1984 as Annex XI. 
138 Due to scarce resources, BEUC stayed away from the funher publica-
tion of the joumal. 
139 
140 
See the description of the system by Domzalski, 1984. 
Interestingly enough, this has on several occasions been called for by 
the Germans, BEUC, 1984, Annex II (note 114 supra), 3 (a) on the part 
ofthe AGV. 
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ble only if an overall concept for building up an information and 
co-ordination network were available. 
6.3.3 Material questions 
The intention is not to provide a stock-taking141 of work to 
date, but merely to illustrate the points at dispute in the individual 
technical committees. 
(1) The starting point for the CEN TC 100 working group is 
a remit from the Commission to CEN142: 
"Jnitially, to determine the requirements for tactile haz-
ard indications on packages intended as containers for 
substances and preparations classed as hazardous by 
national authorities; further, to work out standards for 
means to permit the perception of hazards by touching, 
in order, in particular, to comply with Art. 15 (2) and 
(3) ofDirectives 79/831and78/63". 
These terms of reference from the Community are aimed at 
combating accident risks from chemicals in the household using 
the safety technique of instruction, specifically through a tactile 
indication of hazard. But this safety philosophy was opposed not 
only by the consumer side, but also by some national standards 
organisations that called for special protective devices - child 
resistant closures143. This conflict was resolved when the mem-
141 This attempt is made indirectly by Bosserhoff, who presented a strat-
egy paper to the work:ing group on standards of the Consumer Advi-
sory Council: "Consumer-orientated proposal for a priority programme 
for the drawing-up of European Standards within the competence of 
CEN/CENELEC, printed in BEUC, 1985, Annex VIII a, STD/22/85. 
Bosserhoff presented his ideas in a revised version at the European Fo-
ru9m on _coi:i~umer standardisation (op. cit., note 70), cf. Bosserhoff, 
1 87, Priontatenprogramm. 
142 BEUC, 1984, Annex VI: Reports of meetings of CEN TC 100, Doc. 
IV; Report Brussels, 25-27 June 1984, 1.2. 
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bers of the technical committee agreed to treat special protective 
devices as separate from tactile hazard indication systems, 
thereby requiring separate standardisation144. This compromise 
was facilitated by the need to develop a marking system as 
rapidly as possible in the specific interest of the poorly sighted. 
Ultirnately, however, no agreement could be reached on the basis 
of this compromise either. lt proved impossible from an industrial 
standpoint to develop a uniform methodl45, which had always 
been the priority goal of the consumer organisations. The latter 
had carried out a survey through the CCC that had brought out 
the interest in a uniform method guaranteeing the unambiguous 
nature of the information146. Tue working group temporarily sus-
pended its work and asked the Commission to lay down the re-
quirements for standardisation in precisely worded terms of ref-
erence. The consumer side drew the conclusion from the failure 
of TC 100 that technical committees themselves were not in a po-
sition to secure compromises as to safety philosophy (safety 
technique of instruction versus protective devices). Only a suit-
ably precisely worded remit that the consumer side would play a 
part in drawing up could prevent safety policy from failing to ad-
vance because "commercial circles involved" cannot agree147. 
(2) One of the important points at dispute in Technical 
Committee 61 (safety of electrical household appliances) is the 
so-called exclusion clauseI48. This states that electrical safety 
standards do not take account of the special hazards arising in 
143 BEUC, 1984, Annex VI (note 118 supra), Doc. I: Report Paris, 26-28 
January 1983 (without naming the countries). 
144 BEUC, 1984, Annex VI (note 118 supra), Doc. III: Report of the fifth 
meeting of CEN TC 100 (without figures). 
145 BEUC, 1984, Annex VI (note 118 supra), Doc. III, 2.3. 
146 BEUC, 1984, Annex VI (note 118 supra), Doc. III, 3.3. 
147 BEUC, 1984, 11 et seq. and Op. cit., Annex IV: CEN TC 100 - Tac-
tile danger waming systems SID/17 /85, 1 August 1985. 
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children's rooms, kindergartens, etc. in which small children or 
the aged and infirm people are present without supervision. In 
such cases additional requirements are necessary:149 
"Except in so far as this standard deals with electric 
toys, it does not take into account the special hazards 
which exist in nurseries and other places where there 
are young children or aged or infirm persons without 
supervision; in such cases additional requirements may 
be necessary". 
Tue consumer side has now raised the question of the extent 
to which safety standards meet additional requirements, or 
whether the protection of children or elderly people is no longer 
guaranteed when they are left unsupervised in kitchens or other 
rooms of the home where there are electrical appliances15°. Tue 
suppliers' side sought to downplay the accusation by referring to 
standardisation practices, in which safety is guaranteed even 
without such supervision151. Consumers again found themselves 
in a position of having to offer proof that the level of safety was 
not sufficient. In fact the consumer representatives managed to 
find that the exclusion clause had been adduced in a number of 
cases as an argument against the introduction of comprehensive 
protection measuresI52 . Thus, protection against access to current 
carrying parts is tested with the "standard test finger", based on 
an "average" adult finger. This test may well not constitute ade-
quate protection for many adults, but certainly does exclude chil-
148 BEUC, 1984, Annex IX: Minutes of the Co-ordination Meeting of 
Consurner Expens on CENELEC TC 61 - 8 May 1984, 122/84, 3. 
149 Scope ofHD 254:S:3, printed in: Draft letter from the CCC observer to 
CENELEC TC 61 to the Chairman of CENELEC TC 61, in: BEUC, 
1985, Annex V. 
150 1. Entwurf eines Briefes, BEUC, 1984, Annex X 2. 
151 BEUC, 1985, Repon, Annex II a: Repon of the Meeting of CENELEC 
61, Copenhagen, 7-9 May 1985. The representative of the DIN Con-
surner Counc1l adopted the German industrial standpoint BEUC 1984 
Annex IX (74), 3. ' ' ' 
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dren. This leads to considerable hazards from ventilator heaters 
or other flow heaters accessible to children. Nevertheless, 
CEN/CENELEC continues to reject the introduction of a child-
sized test finger. No special child resistant closure is provided for 
in the case of spin-dryers and washing machines. Sockets on the 
front of electric cookers Iikewise have no protection for children, 
though this is already prescribed in the case of gas cookers. Sur-
face temperatures of electrical appliances are another problem 
area. A large number of appliances provide no protection even 
against severe bums. Tue consumer side is not claiming that all 
appliances ought to be so hazard free that no parental supervision 
is necessary. However, avoidable hazards ought to be removed 
and electrical safety standards ought to take foreseeable condi-
tions of use (not merely proper use) of particular appliances into 
account. On the basis of these considerations, the consumer ob-
server, following consultation with national consumer experts in 
several co-ordination meetings, proposed a revision that posi-
tively asks for foreseeable misuse to be covered in the design of 
electrical appliances that might present a <langer to children and 
elderly persons;l53 
"This Standard takes account of foreseeable misuse 
(other than gross misuse) of equipment by users of all 
ages and also, so far as is reasonable, of the fact that 
the equipment covered by the Standard may be used 
where there are young children and elderly persons". 
Tue suppliers' side rejected this proposal, but at the same 
time had to admit that the present text of the exclusion clause did 
not at any rate reflect practice in safety standardisation. lt there-
fore seems to be possible that the consumer side may at least 
partly succeed with its move. At present, the wording proposed 
152 BEUC, 1984, Annex X, 5-7, from which the examples are taken. 
153 BEUC, 1985, Report, Annex V (note 144 supra). 
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by the British Consumer Advisory Committee is before TC 61 
for debate:154 
"So far is practicable, this standard deals with the 
common hazards presented by appliances which are 
encountered by all persons in and around the home. 
However, except in so far as this standard deals with 
electric toys, it does not in general take into account 
the use of appliances by young children or infirm per-
sons without supervision; for such use additional re-
quirements may be necessary". 
lt is not yet clear whether the compromise proposal will be 
adopted. At any rate, the compromise formula, also supported by 
the IOCU Testing Committeetss, means a considerable step back 
from the original position. For the consumer side gives up the in-
clusion of foreseeable misuse and contents itself with the much 
less specific fonnulation "common hazards", which is in turn in 
need of interpretation. On the positive side, there is now a much 
clearer fonnulation of the circumstances in which safety stan-
dards provide no protection for unsupervised persons. Tue scope 
has been reduced to children only, to avoid discrimination of el-
derly people. 
Tue arguments over the exclusion clarify the need for a 
safety philosophy along the lines of DIN 31000 at a European 
level. This project, which has been worked on since April 1985, 
has involved European consumer representatives since June 
1986156. 
154 BSI Technical Committee LEL/161 Safety of electrical appliances, 
STD 18/86. 
155 See its letter of 21 July 1987 to the Chairman of the working group 
IEC TC 61. 
156 Howeve.r, since June 1986 an observer has been sitting on CEN TC 
144, Mmutes of the CCC Co-ordination Meeting 19 June 1986 
STD/28/86, 3 July 1986. ' ' 
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(3) Often, however, difficulties arise even among national 
consumer representatives in agreeing on a uniform safety philos-
ophy. Thus, the consumer's protection against electric shock must 
be weighed against bis interest in being able to do repair and 
maintenance work himself157. Even if one supports a right of ac-
cess by consumers in principle, it remains to be decided whether 
consumers are to be explicitly encouraged to do work themselves 
and what protective measures are at all possible if consumers are 
to be allowed to do repairs or maintenance. Likewise, the ques-
tion of the protective level for surface temperatures of household 
electrical appliances remains open. Tue British consumer repre-
sentatives want the maximum limit brought below 50 degrees, 
while the German side does not even agree to a maximum of 80 
degrees1ss. Tue list of examples could be extended, though the 
conclusion ought not to be drawn from these disagreements, that 
the consumer side is unable to develop a uniform European safety 
philosophy. 
6.4 Proposals for extending consumer involvement in stan-
dardisation 
Tue present organisation of technical standardisation is re-
garded by all those involved, the Commission, CEN/CENELEC, 
the Consumer Consultative Committee and the Co-ordination 
Secretariat, as a transitional stage. Tue policy of the new ap-
157 BEUC, 1985, Report, Annex I d: Co-ordination Meeting 12 September 
1985 (note 127 supra), 2 and Annex II b: Minutes of the meeting of 
CENELEC, Athens 1-3 October 1985, SID/40/85, 23 October 1985, 6. 
158 See the background paper by D. Grose, BEUC, 1985, Report, Annex 
VI (note 134 supra) and the letter from the German Consumers Associ-
ation to the eo-Ordination meeting in London, 16/17 1985, 10 January 
1985, BEUC, 1985, Report, Annex I d: Co-ordination Meeting 12 
September 1985 (note 124 supra), 2 and Annex II b: Minutes of the 
meeting of CENELEC, Athens 1-3 October 1985, SID/40/85, 23 Oc-
tober 1985, 6. 
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proach seems to have led to the insight by all those involved that 
in the long term, consumer involvement in standardisation must 
be institutionalised. lt is not yet foreseeable, however, what the 
outcome will be. Several proposals are available, but discussions 
have barely begun. 
6.4.1 The Bosma proposa/159 
In her report for DG XI, Bosma proposed the setting up of a 
consumer advisory committee for technical standardisation, to be 
attached to the Standing Cornmittee. Tue object is to guarantee 
access to European standardisation activities by consumer inter-
ests, through institutional collaboration between the Consumer 
Advisory Committee for Technical Standardisation and the 
Standing Cornmittee. Tue committee is to be made up of repre-
sentatives of European consumer organisations (though it is not 
said, this probably means CCC members) and European con-
sumer research institutions such as Swoka, INC, Stifung War-
entest, Husholdningsrad, CRIOC160. While European consumer 
organisations should provide the political input, Bosman assigns 
to the research institutions listed the task of making the necessary 
technical know-how available. Accordingly, the Consumer Advi-
sory Committee on Technical Standardisation would in this con-
ception represent the collective European political and technical 
expertise of the consumer side. lt should among other things have 
the following tasks:l61 
159 S~ Bosma, 19?4, 60 et seq.; and esp. Bosma, 1985, 22 et seq„ espe-
c1ally the orgamgram, 29. 
160 Bosma, 1985, 23. 
161 Op. cit., 23 et seq. 
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To point out to the Standing Committee, developments of 
special interest to the consumer, and make the necessary ex-
pertise available to the Standing Committee in order to as-
sert consumer interests; 
To develop consumer priorities in European standardisation; 
To formulate a consumer safety policy, taking particular ac-
count of technical standards; 
To Iist special research studies needed for consumer desires 
and needs to be recognised in standardisation; 
To make contacts with consumer representations on national 
and international Standards organisations. 
To be able to cope with the multiplicity of tasks, the Advi-
sory Committee would in Bosma's viewI62 have to have special 
technical committees assigned to it: (1) food and nutrition; (2) 
household chemicals; (3) transport, in particular cars; (4) house 
and building materials including fumiture; (5) electrical and 
electronic products. These technical committees are to provide 
the Advisory Committee with the necessary technical informa-
tion, draw up background reports and develop specific proposals, 
in other words, do the complicated technical work. 
Correspondingly, these technical committees should also in-
clude experts with relevant experience in those areas. BosmaI63 is 
thinking above all, apart from test institutions, of independent re-
search institutes dealing with specific aspects of a product 
(ergonomics, safety). She then raises the question whether it 
would not be also advisable to include specialists from industry 
in the work of the technical committees. Though she does not ul-
timately answer the question, she is clearly thinking of an 
"ideology-free discussion" since the technical committees are 
only to have the task of supporting the Advisory Committee on 
standardisation in its work. lt would be incumbent on the Advi-
sory Committee for standardisation to delegate observers to the 
162 Op. cit., 25 et seq. 
51 
technical committees of CEN/CENELEC and to maintain con-
tacts with the Standing Committee. 
Bosma wishes to locate the Secretariat of the Consumer Ad-
visory Committee on standardisation in DG XI. At the same time, 
she advocates formalisation of the consultative relationships be-
tween the Standing Committee and the Consumer Advisory 
Committee on Technical Standardisation. 
6.4.2 The thinking in DG X/164 
DG XI has put forward a proposal of its own for the organi-
sation of consumer participation in standardisation. lt is similarly 
contemplating setting up a special consumer advisory committee 
for technical standardisation. This is, however, to consist of CCC 
members, and no subdivision into special technical committees is 
contemplated. As before, actual administrative work is to be done 
by a secretariat tobe located outside DG XI. "Political control" of 
the Consumer Advisory Committee for technical standardisation 
is to be handled by the CCC working group on standards. DG XI 
is thinking of a division of tasks as already similarly proposed by 
the CCCJ65. This would give the CCC working group on stan-
dards the task of formulating policy, while the Consumer Advi-
sory Committee for technical standardisation would specify these 
outlines with technical content, with assistance from the Secre-
tariat. There are no plans for formalising the relationships be-
tween the Standing Committee and the CCC. 
163 Op. cit., 27. 
164 Annex to the Minutes of the Meeting of the CCC Working Group on 
Standardisation, June 30, STD/27/86, 3 July 1986. 
165 See note 117 supra. 
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6.4.3 Assessment 
lt is striking that neither proposal takes account of the out-
standing importance of safety standards at the European level. 
Consumer safety problems appear as only one conceivable case 
of technical standardisation, although experience over the last 
two years shows that consumer observers on the technical com-
mittees overwhelmingly concentrate on safety questions. Bosma's 
model allows the importance of product safety to be accommo-
dated, since it would be possible to set up a technical subcom-
mittee on product safety that might also possibly involve manu-
facturers. This way out would not be possible in the DG XI pro-
posal. 
Structural problems of consumer involvement arise in each 
proposal. Firstly, it is unclear why Bosma is so insistent on hav-
ing the secretariat located in DG XI. This skepticism is all the 
more important since DG XI evidently has no interest in accom-
modating the secretariat. Bosma's concept completely Jacks any 
discussion of the CCC as such and its working group on stan-
dards. Y et there is an important field here for conflict in the fu-
ture shaping of consumer participation. DG XI seeks to take ac-
count of the institutional framework for consumer participation 
by seeking to bring the Consumer Advisory Committee on tech-
nical standardisation under the political control of the CAC 
working group on standards. But this division of tasks means that 
the Commission is opening up the possibility of potential conflict 
between the working group on standards and the new committee. 
Moreover, the DG XI proposal would ultimately lead to duplica-
tion of the work of the CCC, since the Consumer Advisory 
Committee for technical standardisation would have the same ex-
pert representatives of the four consumer organisations sitting on 
it to deal with standardisation questions. In the long term, trans-
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ferral of standardisation issues from the CCC's range of tasks 
might lead to its weakening. Accordingly, Bosma's proposal 
seems more convincing: the Consumer Advisory Committee on 
technical standardisation should, alongside the four consurner or-
ganisations, also have a place for institutions with years of expe-
rience in the area of technical standardisation. A final striking 
point is that neither Bosma nor DG XI in their proposals, provide 
for procedural rules to be laid down in writing conceming either 
the Standing Committee's relationship to the Consumer Advisory 
Committee for technical standardisation or the Consumer Advi-
sory Committee on technical standardisation's relationship to 
CEN/CENELEC. But this would be one of the major pillars of a 
formal structure ensuring consumer participation in European 
standardisation. 
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CHAPTER VI: 
Summary and conclusions 
Central to all the analyses in the foregoing chapters was the 
question of how the connections between the Community's ef-
forts to establish a common market, with their inevitable influ-
ence on product safety law, would eventually affect integration. 
So far, the answers to this question have been anything but en-
couraging. Although "traditional" harmonisation policy has suc-
ceeded in individual sectors, the legislative tasks involved in 
continuing with such a policy exceed the legislative capacity of 
the Community; this is due to the broad scale of products con-
cemed and the need to continuously update European directives 1. 
This realisation explains the move towards a legal approximation 
policy that relieves the burden on Community legislators and del-
egates technical questions relating to safety law to the standards 
organisations. However, analysis of the Council resolution on a 
"new approach to technical harmonisation and standards"2 has 
shown that a retreat by Community legislators to fixing just 
"essential safety requirements" involves considerable difficulties. 
lt is above all safety policy considerations that have led to am-
bivalent and unclear points in the programme of the Model Di-
rective3, putting at risk the realisation of its internal market ob-
jectives4. Thus, the theme of the following arguments should al-
ready be apparent: if the Community is forced to deal with the ef-
fects of its new harmonisation policy on product safety law in the 
Member States, it has to supplement the new approach. For the 
moment, however, this statement describes merely a need for ac-
2 
3 
Cf. Chapter III, 2.7. 
OJ C 136, 4 June 1985, 1. See further Chapter IV, 3. 
Cf. in particular Chapter IV, 3.2. 
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tion, without defining the objectives and instruments with which 
the Community can counter the <langer of intemal market policy 
being frustrated by product safety policy. 
1. Product safety policy and product safety law in 
Member States 
Tue need for coordination of intemal market and product 
safety policy is ultimately the consequence of safety matters be-
ing taken up in the respective legislations of the Member States. 
Tue General Programme of 28 May 1969 for eliminating techni-
cal barriers to trade regarding the movement of goods5 was an 
early response to the "discovery" that the achievement of a com-
mon market is hindered not only by tariffs and quantitative re-
strictions but also by differences in laws and administrative pro-
visions in the Member States - not covered by the prohibition of 
Article 30 of the EEC Treaty. Tue differential application and 
limitation of the programme as a result of the provisions for op-
tional harmonisation and the introduction of safeguard clauses 
were also concessions to the safety policy interests of Member 
States6. A further aim of these instruments, together with the in-
troduction of the regulative and administrative committee proce-
dure under Article 155, fourth indent7, was to relieve the burden 
on the Community's legislative process. Tue new harmonisation 
policy, which confines itself to setting essential safety require-
ments, represents a continuation of these efforts. Tue reasoning 
behind the Model Directive does not, however, call into question 
in principle the legitimacy of govemment provisions for product 
4 
5 
6 
56 
Cf. Chapter V, 3.1. 
OJ C 76, 17 June 1969, l; cf. Chapter III, 2. 
Cf. Chapter III, 2.3 and 2.5. 
safety8, but rather presupposes that the new harmonisation policy 
should be compatible with the safety interests of Member States. 
1.1 Convergences 
Tue comparative survey of the law in the economically most 
important Member States of the Community and the USA reveals 
an astonishing convergence of regulatory approaches, which will 
contribute towards acceptance of the new harmonisation policy. 
An essentially positive attitude was to be expected from the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany, because co-operation between gov-
emment bodies and self-goveming industrial organisations in the 
field of technical safety law has been part of German legal tradi-
tion since the 19th century9, and because the Federal Republic 
also played a major part in implementing the "model" for the 
Model Directive, i.e. the Low-Voltage Directive of 197310. How-
ever, for the United Kingdom and France, the adoption of a reg-
ulatory system for product safety law based on the method of ref-
erence to standards is anything but obvious. With the CPA 1961, 
safety legislation in the United Kingdom opted for a govemment-
administered approach to regulation. This approach was already 
modified by the 1978 Consumer Safety Act 11 . But it was not until 
1984 that the White Paper "Tue safety of goods"I2 made the first 
move toward a rapprochement with German law, with its pro-
posal for a general product safety obligation to be defined with 
reference to "sound modern standards of safety". This conver-
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
Cf. supra III, 2.6. and 2.7. 
Cf. the principles in part A of the Model Directive (note 2). 
Cf. Chapter II, 3.2. 
Cf. Chapter IV, 2. 
Cf. Chapter II, 2.3. 
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gence is even more obvious in the efforts to strengthen the British 
standards organisations and ensure their formal recognition by 
govemment13. In France the development is less clear, if only be-
cause standardisation is closely linked, legally speaking as weil, 
with the govemment administration, and because product stan-
dardisation and the protection of safety interests are regarded as 
two separate govemment functionsl4. Furthermore, the Consumer 
Safety Law of 21 July 198315 and its new instruments are as yet 
virtually untested in practice16. Tue argument that developments 
in France are moving towards the legislative approach of the 
Model Directive thus rests on the assumption that in France, too, 
the preventive protection of safety interests is increasingly being 
approached through co-operation between govemment adminis-
tration and AFNOR, whereby the administrative controls pro-
vided for in the 1983 Consumer Safety Law are not being fully 
exploited to regulate the development of safety law. The Com-
mission can be confident that this convergence of developments 
in the economically most important Member States will influence 
the Community as a whole, and it can point to the fact that im-
portant non-member countries are also increasingly favouring the 
use of voluntary standards in their product safety policiesl7. 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
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Cmnd. 9302, HMSO, London, July 1984. 
Cf. Chapter II, 2.4 and 2.6.2. 
Cf. Chapter II, 1.1, 1.4 and 1.7. 
10 115 No. 168, 2261, 22 July 1983. 
Cf. Chapter II, 1.2-1.5. 
Cf. e.g. the USA •. Chapter II, 4.4, and the OECD Report "Development 
and Implementation of Product Safety Measures", Paris 1986 (as yet 
unpubhshed), Chapter II, 3. 
1.2 Divergences 
However, the trend towards encouraging voluntary stan-
dards does not in itself guarantee the smooth harmonisation of 
their function as regards safety policy. The stable co-operation 
between govemment and standards organisations in Germany, 
which has led to the wide acceptance of the reference method as a 
means of safety regulation, is the outcome of a long historical 
process. This process cannot simply be copied, and the role of 
govemment administration in co-operation with standards organi-
sations will continue to vary from country to countryl8. In partic-
ular, the concrete results of standardisation will in all probability 
differ. Before the House of Lords Select Cornmittee on European 
Comrnunity Consumer Policy, the BSI representative emphasised 
that, particularly where safety standards were concemed, differ-
ing national conditions played a considerable role and, moreover, 
there were substantial differences in the standard of safety within 
the Community19. 
In addition, there are significant differences in national 
standardisation procedures, particularly with regard to the par-
ticipation of consumer organisations20, the coverage of standards 
work and the actual use of standards in industrial production. Fi-
nally, it remains tobe seen whether the national standards organi-
sations can develop a common "safety philosophy", and what ef-
fect differences in their general attitude to safety policy will have, 
for example in their assessment of the functions of accident in-
18 
19 
The example of the shift from compulsory to voluntary Standards as the 
primary means of regulation in the USA is instructive; the functions of 
the Consumer Product Safety Commission in monitorin~ or partici-
pating in standardisation projects appear to extend considerably be-
yond the influence exerted by govemment on the DIN institute (cf. 
supra Chapter II, 4.4). 
House of Lords, Select Committee on the European Communities, 
Consumer Policy (Session 1985-85, 15th Report, HL 192), London 
1986, 158-59. 
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formation systems21. lt goes without saying that all these diffi-
culties in ensuring an equal standard of safety in the Community 
are compounded when the countries "below the olive line"22 and 
their industrial and administrative infrastructures are taken into 
account23. Accordingly, the importance of the parallels between 
the traditions of German technical safety law and the strengthen-
ing of the standards organisations in the United Kingdom and 
France should not be exaggerated. Tue convergences observed 
are - like the Community's new harmonisation policy - essen-
tially motivated by industrial policy. Tue linking of standardisa-
tion and safety policy could once again be called into question in 
changed political circumstances. 
lt would be hazardous to assume that the German approach 
to product safety will automatically provide a model for others, if 
only because product safety issues repeatedly attract public at-
tention in all Member States in cycles that are difficult to predict, 
and then prompt widely differing reactions24. Individual Member 
States are therefore always likely to resort to special measures to 
counter certain product risks, to question the appropriateness of 
the reference method as far as safety law is concemed (or at least 
to wish to strengthen their control over private standards organi-
20 
21 
22 
23 
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On the position in France see Chapter II, 1.7.2; on the UK Chapter II, 
2.2.1, 2.3.2 and 2.6.1; for German Law, see Chapter II, 3.4.5. 
The decidedly positive attitude of the BSI to the HASS System (loc. 
cit., note 19, 160) corresponds to the recognition accorded to NEISS in 
the USA (see supra, Chapter II, 4.4.2, note 125). DIN evidently thinks 
differently. 
This formulation was used by a representative of the UK National 
Cc?nsm_ner Council, loc. cit. (note 19), 60; all interest groups agreed on 
th1s pomt (cf. for the assessment of the BSI, loc. cit., 159). 
lt is ~oubtful.whether experience with the Low Voltage Directive will 
perma opposite conclusions to be drawn because (a) international stan-
dardisation is particularly weil developed in the field of electrical engi-
neenng and (b) there are no empirical surveys of the standard of safety 
even _in the electrical appliances sector (for an anecdotal example of 
the d1fferences between Italy and the United Kingdom, cf. the hearings 
of the Select Committee, loc. cit., note 19, 96-97). 
sations) and to augment their range of instruments for product 
safety policy. Finally, the different situations of "manufacturing" 
and "importing" countries should also be recalled25. Since 
"importing countries" have no influence on the fixing of national 
standards and can be bypassed at the European level as regards 
both standardisation and the recognition procedure26, and as they 
need to consider only price effects and safety interests when de-
ciding on the level of product safety, they would not necessarily 
be committed to either the forms or the result of the new reguJa-
tory method27. 
Consequently, the Community must assume that product 
safety policy will remain a critical issue within Member States, 
that the search for appropriate regulatory instruments will con-
tinue and that not the issue of legal protection as such, but at most 
the forms this will take, will be subject to political negotiation. If 
this diagnosis is correct, there is no real alternative for the Com-
munity, either, but to carry on with both elements of its integra-
tion policy- intemal market policy andproduct safety policy. 
2. Integration policy options 
Tue finding that the integrative force of the new regulatory 
system in the Model Directive will hardly suffice to overcome 
impediments to the free movement of goods, due to differing 
product safety requirements, simply means that the Community 
has to exert even stronger influence on legal controversies as to 
24 
25 
26 
27 
Cf. Chapter I before 1. and 4. 
Cf. the remarks on the attitude of Canada in the OECD report cited in 
note 17 supra (Chapter II, 3, para. 69). 
Cf. Chapter IV, 3.3-3.6. 
Cf. Chapter III, 1.2.1, text accompanying notes 19 et seq. 
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the content and form of product safety law, than it has already 
done with its new approach to technical hannonisation and stan-
dards. 
However, this still leaves open the form tobe taken by such 
influence; the Community can either seek to reduce national 
powers of intervention, or extend its attempts to move towards a 
"positive" integration of product safety policy. 
2.1 Interna! market policy as a deregulation strategy 
The results of the Community's endeavours to implement its 
consurner policy programmes have been modest28. This suggests 
that a Community strategy for the "deregulation" of product 
safety law in the Member States will have more chance of suc-
cess than a fresh attempt at "positive" integration. Tue new har-
monisation policy has hence been interpreted as heralding such a 
deregulation strategy. 
Probably the most prominent advocate of such an interpre-
tation, or at any rate the most forceful, is the Wissenschaftlicher 
Beirat (Scientific Advisory Council) of the German Federal 
Ministry of Economic Affairs29. lt bases its interpretation of the 
new approach on the statement contained in the Cassis de Dijon 
judgment30, and taken up by the Commission in its communica-
tion of 3 October 198031, to the effect that any product lawfully 
produced and marketed in one Member State must be admitted to 
28 
29 
30 
62 
Cf. Chapter III, 3. 
Stellungnahme zum Weißbuch der EG-Kommission über den Binnen-
markt, Bonn 1986; see also Joerges, 1988, 199-200. 
f:.se 12on8, Judgment of 20 February 1979, ECR [1979] 649, para. 
''~· 
the market of any other Member State32. In the view of the 
Beirat, the mutual recognition of safety standards is the conse-
quence of this principle, so the harmonisation of safety require-
ments is not necessary for the establishment of the intemal mar-
ket except in exceptional cases33. However, the Beirat bases its 
thesis not only on the text of the Commission's White Paper but 
also on independent arguments relating to the competition policy 
and regulative functions of the principle of the free movement of 
goods: in principle (it argues) it is up to the European consumer 
(not the individual Member State) to decide the standard of qual-
ity and safety of products. Therefore it concludes that where gov-
emments cannot agree on the harmonisation of product standards, 
competition between products manufactured according to differ-
ent Standards is reasonable and, in the Iong term, the price-per-
formance ratio (or range of products) that best meets consumer 
demands will prevaiJ34. 
However, this is not a valid interpretation of the Commis-
sion's White Paper or the case law of the European Court of Jus-
tice. Tue statement quoted by the Beirat from the White Paper is 
based, as is apparent from the context, on the - albeit problem-
atical35 - assumption that provisions in Member States govem-
ing safety are generally equivalent; neither in its Cassis decision 
nor in any subsequent judgments has the European Court sus-
pended safety requirements in the Member States pursuant to Ar-
ticle 30 of the EEC Treaty regarding imports36; an obligation as 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
01 C 256, 3 October 1980, 2. 
Loc. cit. (note 29), para. 3. 
Loc. cit., paras. 4 and 3. 
Loc. cit., para. 4. 
"Completing the internal market", White Paper from the Commission 
to the European Council, COM (85) 310, 14 June 1985, para. 58: if 
safety regufations share the same objectives but differ in the means 
employed, this may weil lead to real differences in the standard of 
safety. 
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to "mutual recognition" of safety measures taken by the Member 
States presupposes the harmonisation of the preconditions for 
recognition37. 
Tue position of the Beirat is, however, questionable not just 
in exegetic and legal terms but also - and especially - in terms 
of legal policy and integration policy. Tue first point at issue is 
the initial normative premise that the decision as to the standard 
of protection provided by product regulations is in principle to be 
left to the end-user, whose protection is to be ensured primarily 
by means of information, obligatory labelling and "strict producer 
liability"38. Tue Beirat does not attempt to justify its regulatory 
principles vis-a-vis alternative views of product safety policy. If 
it had done so, it would have become clear first of all that influ-
encing of the safety practice of consumers "in line with market 
principles" - the only approach envisaged by the Beirat - and 
obligatory or semi-govemmental product regulation, which are 
the main targets of the removal of technical barriers to trade, have 
widely differing objectives and cannot simply be subsumed to-
gether as functionally equivalent measures39. Tue distinction 
between "market'', "interventionist" and "self-regulating" regula-
tory instruments also shows that the standpoint of the Beirat on 
integration policy has no normative justification and is scarcely 
feasible in positive terms. 
Tue demand that the Community should at all times enforce 
the principle of the free movement of goods and promote "intra-
Community competition between standards", even where har-
monisation of product regulations cannot be achieved, in fact 
means that enterprises in the "safety countries" will be forced to 
36 
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Cf. supra Chapter IV, 1.2. 
Cf. Chapter III, 1.1, note 11, Chapter IV, 3.3.2. 
Loc. cit. (note 29), para. 4. 
accept cost disadvantages in competition with enterprises in "risk 
countries"40. The disadvantaged enterprises may respond to these 
distortions of competition by exerting political pressure to ease 
domestic safety regulations or shifting their production to "risk 
countries" - whatever happens, the "safety countries" would be 
under pressure to adopt a deregulation policy. Such consequences 
pose a threat to regulatory measures that are justified in them-
selves, and are unacceptable, amongst other things because they 
remove the decision for or against safety regulations from the 
political decision-making process and place it at the mercy of the 
strategic calculations of individual countries and enterprises. 
The views of the Beirat on integration policy moreover ig-
nore an option that suggests itself, at any rate as a "normative" 
approach, particularly where there are differences in product reg-
ulation, an opinion that is furtherrnore constantly emphasised in 
the economic theory of federalism41: the performance or coordi-
nation of regulatory functions at European Jevel may secure ad-
ministrative cost benefits and also be ''beneficial" where the pos-
itive "external effects" of a govemment measure cannot be con-
fined to a single area of jurisdiction. 
However, an integration policy strategy that uses the princi-
ple of the free movement of goods as an instrument to deregulate 
product safety law in the Member States would be not only dubi-
ous as a "normative" approach but also scarcely feasible in posi-
tive terms. Any lowering of the standard of product safety does 
not a priori meet a genuine interest of "the" European economy. 
On the contrary, enterprises in Member States with high 
Standards may even secure competitive advantages from a gen-
39 
40 
Cf. Chapter I, 3. for details. 
For terminology cf. Chapter III, 1.2.1, note 20. 
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eral raising of the standard of safety. Furthermore, in view of the 
political sensitivity of safety issues, the Member States cannot 
call into question their own product regulations just like that. Tue 
history of the Single European Act42 and also the discussion to 
date on the new approach point in the same direction. lt was not 
the "risk countries" which insisted on the proviso of Article 100 
(a) (4)43, nor does agreement to the "reference method" of the 
new approach indicate that the "safety countries" are prepared to 
accept a reduction in the Ievel of safety provided by their stan-
dards44. 
2.2 Positive integration as an alternative 
Tue "traditional" alternative to the deregulation of safety 
law in Member States has been the sectorial (vertical) harmoni-
sation of their product regulations. This policy has failed because 
it both overtaxes the legislative capacity of the Community45 and 
blocks the emergence of a coherent European safety policy46. 
However, the acceptance of these objections to the traditional 
policy of legal approximation itself raises the question of whether 
the New Approach in its present form does in fact inaugurate a 
new epoch in market integration. This skepticism ultimately de-
rives from the fact that the new harmonisation policy does not 
eliminate all the causes of the difficulties in reaching agreement 
at a European level, but simply adopts a new procedure for tack-
41 
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Cf. Chapter III, 1.2.1, note 14. 
EC Bull„ Annex 2/86. 
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Commun 1986, 307 et seq„ 313 et seq. 
Cf. opinion of the BSI in the hearings of the Select Committee, loc. cit. 
(note 19), 146 et seq., 157 et seq. 
For details Chapter III, 2.7. 
ling them: for example, the economic conflicts of interest be-
tween Member States remain in spite of the delegation of techni-
cal harmonisation to the standards organisations. 
Although the involvement of technical experts and the ma-
jority-voting rules of the standards organisations may make it 
easier to reach decisions, the Member Stares can assert their in-
terest when deciding on the implementation of individual direc-
tives, defining safety objectives and, in particular, when making 
subsequent use of the safeguard procedures - experience with 
the Low-Voltage Directive also shows that provisions for foJlow-
up control are in fact exploited as preventive measures47. 
In addition, in view of the vagueness and non-binding nature 
of the provisions of the Model Directive conceming safety law48, 
there are likely to be great problems identifying and preventing 
self-interested policies motivated by protectionism in negotia-
tions on the implementation of new directives. In addition to eco-
oomic conflicts of interest, political conflicts in the area of prod-
uct safety policy continue to be disruptive factors. Because of its 
one-sided bias towards the free movement of goods and its ne-
glect of the safety policy dimension of the integration process, 
the new standardisation policy will not be able to prevent Mem-
ber States from continuing to develop instruments for product 
safety law independently and applying them in different ways49. 
46 
47 
48 
49 
Cf. supra Chapter III, 1.2.1, 2.4. 
Cf. supra Chapter IV, 2.3.3. 
Cf. Chapters IV, 3.2 and V, 1.1. 
Cf. in particular Chapters IV, 3.4 and V, 4. 
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3. Towards augmenting the new approach in terms of 
safety law 
Intemal market policy and consumer policy are handled by 
different Directorates-General; the original programmes in both 
policy areas have developed independently in terms of both con-
tent and timing. 
This applies to the General Programme of 1969 for elimi-
nating technical barriers to trade and the new approach of 1985, 
and likewise to the consumer policy programmes of 1975 and 
1981. Tue safety issue links both areas, but in terms of intemal 
market policy it has been seen primarily as a "barrier to trade", 
while in the context of consumer policy it has been proclaimed as 
a goal in itself, as the "right to the protection of health and 
safety". Tue Commission document "A new impetus for con-
sumer protection policy"50 is the clearest expression so far of the 
endeavour to overcome the separation of intemal market policy 
and consumer policy. The perspectives set out in this document 
accord with the results of our analyses: because the new harmoni-
sation policy would not be viable as a mere deregulation strategy, 
because a retum to "traditional" legal approximation policy is 
ruled out, the Community does indeed require a "comprehensive 
product safety policy"51. Coordination of intemal market and 
consumer policies does not necessarily mean that their specific 
priorities will be ignored, yet it can improve the chances of suc-
cess for both areas. With intemal market policy, the aim is to 
counter any threat posed to the free movement of goods by diver-
gent product safety policies in the Member States; consumer 
policy can take up this interest and hence at the same time meet 
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Communication from the Commission to the Council, 23 July 1985, 
COM (85) 314 final, in particular paras. 19 et seq.; see also the Com-
munication from the Commission to the Council on "The integration of 
consumer policy in the other common policies", 24 October 1986, 
COM (86) 540 final, paras. 6 et seq. 
the objections to the legitimacy of the Europeanisation of product 
safety law. 
3.1 Coordination mechanisms 
Tue coordination of internal market and product safety poli-
cies requires both internal synchronisation within the Commis-
sion and ongoing co-operation with the Member States. Tue 
analysis of the effects of the new approach on product safety law 
has already produced concrete proposals for internal coordination 
at the Community level. Tue main tasks are the development of 
safety objectives and the preparation of corresponding standards. 
With its "demonstration project" for accident information sys-
tem52, the Community has an instrument at its disposal for 
recording and analysing product hazards. All countries that have 
set up similar systems make use of the results for their product 
safety policies and for standardisation53, and the Community's 
demonstration project also has these objectives54. Although it can 
hardly be expected that new harmonisation efforts will be ori-
ented solely towards safety policy priorities dictated by the acci-
dent information system, the findings of the latter should be taken 
into account in decisions on the recognition of standards and at-
testation of conformity, in safeguard procedures andin the prepa-
ration of European standards. Conversely, the accident inforrna-
tion system can help to settle doubts and controversies concern-
ing the administration of the new standardisation policy, by con-
centrating resources for in-depth studies of accident risks on 
51 
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53 
COM (85) 314 final, para. 19. 
OJ L 109, 26 April 1986, 23; cf. Chapters III, 3.3 and V, 2. 
For the USA cf. Chapter II, 4.2 and 4.4.2, for the United Kingdom cf. 
Chapter II, 2.5 and 2.8.1, for the Netherlands, cf. Rogmans, 1985, 73 et 
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those areas in which Community decisions are pending and stan-
dardisation work has started. 
Also worth recalling is the possibility of underpinning har-
monisation policy by means of a systematic evaluation of product 
liability procedures in Member States55. 
With regard to the Member States, the task is to monitor 
implementation of the reference method, while taking safety 
policy requirements into account and endeavouring to ensure that 
safety law develops along lines compatible with the freedom of 
movement of goods. The Information Directive of 28 March 
198356 already ensures that the Commission is provided with ex-
tensive information on relevant plans in Member States. How-
ever, the chances of exerting influence via the "standstill" ar-
rangements in Articles 7 and 9 are limited and do not cover ur-
gent measures motivated by safety policy (Article 9 (3))57. As the 
new harmonisation policy is implemented, the information avail-
able to the Community will improve, given the recognition and 
safeguard procedures and as a result of co-operation with certifi-
cation bodies in Member States. On the other hand, the con-
comitant decision-making tasks will become more complicated. 
These tasks can be approached only through a long-term process 
of exerting influence to coordinate national developments58. 
The solution that suggests itself is to establish a Standing 
Committee on product safety law for these tasks, to ensure the 
ongoing involvement of national bodies responsible for product 
safety in the Community policy-making process, covering the 
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entire activities of the Community in the field of product safety 
policy - following the example of the Standing Committee set 
up under the 1983 Information Directive. This Committee could 
also contribute to the intemal synchronisation referred to above 
between intemal market policy and product safety policy, and 
coordinate the work of bodies charged by the Community with 
specific tasks in the field of product safety policy59. These tasks 
are described in more detail below. The decisive point is that 
Member States be represented on the proposed new committee by 
representatives and experts responsible nationally for the admin-
istration of product safety law. This would lead to the following 
general division of functions: 
Table 1: Division of functions between the Standing Committee on 
technical standards and regulations and a Standing Committee on 
product safety. 
Standing Committee on 
technical standards and 
regulations (Information 
Directive of 1983 and Model 
Directive of 1985) 
Co-operation with Member 
States 
Participation in decision-
making by the Commission 
Legal status: 
regulatory an?Jor ggminis-
trau ve commlltee 
Standing Committee on product 
safety (future Product Safety 
Directive) 
Long-term coordination of product 
safety policy in Member States 
Participation in decision-making 
Legal status: 
advisory committee61 
Co-operation between the two Standing Comrnittees should 
be provided for in a future Product Safety Directive, with the de-
tails to be regulated by their mies of procedure. 
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Cf. Chapter V, 4. 
Cf. 3.4.4.1 infra for details. 
For reasons, cf. Chapter IV, 3.6 and 5.3 supra. 
Cf. also 3.4.4.1 infra. 
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3.2 Standardisation procedures and consumer participation 
A method of regulation such as reference to Standards can-
not be introduced in isolation. lt requires adaptation on the part of 
the institutions concemed and furthermore a framework to meet 
objections to the legitimacy of this form of regulation. This has 
already become apparent from the need to ensure equivalence in 
the working of national certification bodies by means of Com-
munity rules62. However, this also applies to the legislative con-
ditions required for the reference method itself. Significantly, the 
convergence in standardisation policies in the Federal Republic 
of Germany, the United Kingdom, France and at Community 
level already extends to standardisation procedures. In these 
Member States, government influence on standardisation has 
been secured by agreements with the standards organisations, 
while consumer organisations have been given the opportunity to 
participate in the preparation of safety standards for consumer 
goods63. 
The Guidelines agreed on by the Commission and 
CEN/CENELEC on 13 November 1984 are analogous arrange-
ments. Tue main principles of Community standardisation policy 
are thus: government influence on standardisation projects, con-
sumer participation and legal control of standardisation results. 
All these principles still need to be worked out in detail and es-
tablished as binding rules. 
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Cf. Chapter IV, 3.3.2 supra. 
See references in note 20, and for the legal justification Chapter IV, 
5.1. 
3 .2 .1 Rights of participation 
Particularly urgent with regard to enhancing the status of 
European standardisation64 is clarification of the role of con-
sumer participation6S. Tue Community's standardisation policy 
takes a long-term approach. Under Article 6 of the Information 
Directive of 28 March 198366, the Commission consults with the 
Standing Committee on technical standards and regulations on 
the working of the Directive and on standardisation priorities. In 
accordance with Article 6 (7) of the Directive, these discussions 
are confidential. However, this does not rule out consultation of 
experts, and the General Guidelines of 13 November 1984 for co-
operation between the Commission and CEN/CENELEC67 indi-
cate that participation by the European standardisation organisa-
tions is desirable at this early stage. Such early co-operation is 
useful in order to ensure mutual coordination of working pro-
grammes. The same applies to consumer participation, given that 
the establishment of priorities requires a trade-off between inter-
nal-market and safety policy interests. Consumer participation is 
particularly essential where the granting of standardisation man-
dates is concemed. In accordance with Annex II of the Council 
Decision of 7 May 198568, these mandates are intended to ensure 
the "quality of harmonised standards". They thus interpret and 
work out in detail the safety objectives of new directives and 
hence form an integral part of standardisation work, in which 
consumer participation is provided for by Section B (V) ( 4) of the 
Model Directive. However, the main work involved in preparing 
64 
65 
66 
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Cf. Chapter IV, 3.5. and 5. 
Cf. Chapter VI, 6. 
01L109, 26 April 1983, 8. 
Reprinted in DIN-Mitteilungen 64 (1985), 48. 
OJ C 136, 4 June 1985, 3; it should now be added that Article 1 (!) of 
the Comrnission's proposal for amending the infonnation directive ex-
plicitly provides for involvement of the Standing Committee in 
preparing standardisation mandates (OJ C 71, 19 March 1987, 12; see 
also Chapter IV, 3.1, note 144 and 3.6, note 240). 
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safety standards will be carried out by the technical committees 
of CEN/CENELEC. The most important part of consumer par-
ticipation is hence sitting on these committees. 
One of the functions of consumer involvement is to repre-
sent safety interests independently of the interests of enterprises, 
as the parties directly addressed by standards. Tue performance 
of this function requires not only participation in standardisation 
work but also access to information relevant to safety policy. Tue 
main source of information - the data from the demonstration 
project on accident information systems - is not public, pursuant 
to Article 7 (1) of the Council Decision of 22 April 198669. Tue 
exchange of information on hazards arising from the use of con-
sumer goods is also confined by the Council Decision of 2 March 
1984 to communication between competent authorities70. These 
restrictions are not compatible with the requirements of meaning-
ful consumer participation. 
3.2.2 Organisationa/ structures 
Consumer participation at all stages of standardisation work 
stems from the realisation that informed involvement requires 
continuous collaboration throughout the standardisation process. 
Also essential for informed participation, however, is the estab-
lishrnent of suitable infrastructures. To this end, a forum should 
first of all be created for European consumers - a "Consumers' 
Consultative Committee on standardisation". Tue task of this 
committee would be to ensure that consumers have a say in ne-
69 
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Note 52 supra; in contrast, Article 7 of the Commission proposal for a 
Community accident information system (COM (84) 735, 7 January 
1.985) provided for a publicly accessible documentation and informa-
tion centre. 
OJ L 70, 13 March 1984, 16. 
gotiating standardisation mandates in the Standing Committee 
and to organise the input from the consumer side to 
CEN/CENELEC. This dual function requires political and tech-
nical expertise. In addition to the four member organisations of 
the Consumers' Consultative Committee (CCC), competent ex-
perts from national consumer testing institutes and scientific re-
search establishments therefore need to be involved. Tue admin-
istration of the Consumers' Consultative Committee on standardi-
sation should be in the hands of a secretariat, as heretofore. Tue 
exact division of tasks between the Committee and the secretariat 
would need to be set out in rules of procedure. lt would be advis-
able to leave the secretariat in the hands of the BEUC (Bureau 
Europeen des Unions des Consommateurs), as it already has a 
well-established network of information and contacts with na-
tional member organisations. Tue only legal basis required is for 
the existence of such a committee, its composition and the estab-
lishment of a secretariat. 
This means that the scheme outlined above needs to be ex -
tended as follows: 
Table 2: Involvement of private panies in the Standing Committees on 
technical standards and regulations and on product safety 
Commission: Standing Committee on Standing Committee on 
Private 
panies: 
technical standards product safety 
CEN/CENELEC Consumers' Consultative Committee 
The General Guidelines of 13 November 1984 provide in 
principle for access by such a "Consumers' Consultative Com-
mittee on standardisation" to the work of CEN/CENELEC. The 
revision of CEN/CENELEC rules of procedure to this end could 
take national models as examples. Tue rules of procedure of the 
Standing Committee on technical standards and regulations 
should provide opportunities for participation. 
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3.3 General product safety obligation 
Tue coordination of product safety law in Member States 
and the elimination of resistance motivated by safety policy con-
siderations to implementation of the new harmonisation policy 
are aims that do not necessarily require the establishment of de-
tailed safety requirements - they are more likely to succeed 
through a broader form of influence on product safety law in 
Community Member States. A step in this direction - and one 
that can be put into effect immediately - has already been an-
nounced as part of the "New Impetus" for consumer policy: the 
introduction of a general product safety obligation 71 . A product 
safety obligation laid down in Community law would have lim-
ited but varied functions. Initially, it would contribute towards 
the cohesion of product safety and standardisation policy by es-
tablishing a universally binding fundamental principle. 
Tue Model Directive, which implicitly presupposes a gen-
eral product safety policy, is unable to perform this function, if 
only because it is formulated too vaguely and is not even legally 
binding72. By imposing a general product safety obligation, the 
Community would secure the harmonisation of existing product 
safety laws and planned legislation in Member States. However, 
such an obligation would in particular have an immediate practi-
cal impact in all those countries that do not yet have general 
product safety laws. In such cases, it would provide the compe-
tent authorities with grounds for intervention and hence promote 
adherence to directives and standards. At the same time, it would 
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Loc. cit. (note 50), para. 23. More recently, see in detail the Commis-
sion Communication on safety of consumers in relation to consumer 
products, 8 May 1987, COM (87) 209 final. 
Cf. Chapter V, 1. 
encourage standards organisations to step up work on safety 
standards. 
Product safety obligations in the various national legisla-
tions differ in the way they are formulated. The German Appli-
ances Safety Law (Gerätesicherheitsgesetz) refers to "generally 
recognised rules of the art" (allgemein anerkannte Regeln der 
Technik) and provides protection in the case of "proper use" 
(bestimmungsgemäße Verwendung) - although the basic stan-
dards DIN 820, Part 12 and DIN 31.000NDE 1000 call for 
"foreseeable misuse" (voraussehbares Fehlverhalten)73 to be 
taken into account. Article 1 of the French Consumer Safety 
Law74 refers to "normal" use (condition normale) or use that can 
be reasonably foreseen by the manufacturer (condition 
raisonnablement previsible), and "legitimate" consumer expecta-
tions. The US Consumer Product Safety Act uses the expressions 
"unreasonable risk of injury" (for product bans under § 8 CPSA) 
and "substantial risk of injury" (for recall procedures pursuant to 
§ 15 CPSA), requiring that foreseeable misuse be taken into ac-
count 75. § 3 (1) of the British Consumer Protection Act 198776 
follows the model of the Product Liability Directive ("There is a 
defect in a product. .. if the safety of the product is not such as 
persons generally are entitled to expect. .. "); but the description 
of the product safety requirement for the purposes of the criminal 
law in§ 10 (2) says: " ... consumer goods fail to comply with the 
general safety requirement if they are not reasonably safe having 
regard to all the circumstances ... ". Article 14 (a) in the Dutch 
bill amending the "Warenwet" (Goods Law) aims to provide 
73 
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Cf. Chapter II, 3.5 for details. 
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Cf. Chapter II, 2.4.2. 
77 
protection against hazards arising from reasonably foreseeable 
use (overeenkomstig redelijkerwijze te verwachten gebruik)77. 
A decision in favour of a European general clause is made 
easier by the fundamental consensus on safety policy, which is 
evident in spite of the wide variation among the examples men-
tioned, and by the limited functions of such a general clause. 
There is a consensus that safety criteria should not be defined 
unilaterally by the manufacturer78. This principle, which is com-
mon to all modern product safety laws and which is set out, as far 
as the Federal Republic of Germany is concemed, in the basic 
safety standards DIN 820, Part 12 and DIN 31.000NDE 1000, 
precludes the adoption of the expression "proper use" 
(bestimmungsgemäßer Gebrauch) employed in § 3 of the German 
Appliances Safety Law79. 
Tue general clause is intended to anticipate standardisation 
in individual sectors and help consolidate European legislation. lt 
is also intended to provide for powers of intervention in those 
Member States that do not possess fully-fledged systems of na-
tional standards, and cover products for which there are no safety 
standards. lt necessarily follows from the above that the general 
cause cannot refer to standards as such. 
Finally, in view of the interest of the Community in a safety 
counterpart to the principle of the free movement of goods, the 
product safety obligation must extend explicitly to importers and 
dealers as well. No distinction should be made between importers 
and dealers in intra-Community trade, since the aim of the efforts 
77 
78 
78 
Tweede Karner, vergaderjaar 1985-1986, 17495 No. 18; on legal de-
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147 et seq. and 152 et seq. (specifically on the safety obligation in lia-
bility law). 
Cf. Chapter I, 2.1 for details. 
to achieve the intemal market is precisely to secure a common 
European standard of safety and mutual recognition of national 
control measures. On the other hand, the jurisdiction of the vari-
ous administrations remains confined to their respective territo-
ries. The safety loopholes this entails can only be closed by ex-
tending the product safety obligation to cover the trade sectoi-80. 
Accordingly, the question remains as to which alternative to 
"proper use" should be incorporated in the general clause. Reli-
able pointers exist for this decision as well. Firstly, the general 
clause must be formulated so broadly as to cover the safety needs 
of all consumer groups, particularly children. Consequently, it 
should take account of "foreseeable misuse"8I. On the other hand, 
however, the criterion of foreseeable misuse cannot be assumed 
to apply to all products without taking their use and users into ac-
count. In particular, there is no question that, in addition to the 
definition of the responsibilities of manufacturers and users, a 
large number of additional factors are relevant for a normative 
assessment of risks: the usefulness of the product, the likelihood 
of harm being caused and the extent of potential hazards, the 
availability of suitable technical alternatives, and the cost of 
safety design requirements82. A formulation that provides for 
distinctions to be made and for all factors relevant for assessing 
safety tobe taken into account is contained in the Product Liabil-
ity Directive83, which refers to "the safety which a person is enti-
79 
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tled to expect". There are pragmatic considerations in favour of 
such a criterion. Parallel development of product liability law and 
safety law would help consolidate Community law, while the 
Member States should find it easier to agree on a previously ac-
cepted standard than to consent to a new formulation. Tue choice 
of this criterion is, moreover, in line with the development of the 
law in the Member States. lt accords with French law and the 
Dutch "Warenwet"84, should be reconcilable with the likely ap-
plication of the British Consumer Protection Act 198785, and is 
de facto compatible with the legal situation in the Federal Re-
public of Germany86. 
3.4 Follow-up market control 
Tue main practical point of connection between the Com-
munity's intemal market policy and its product safety policy is 
follow-up market control. Tue attitude of the Community to this 
tool represents the acid test of the quality of its new legal ap-
proximation policy. Tue following considerations are intended as 
suggestions for Community framework regulations on follow-up 
market control. They first of all explain why a bold harmonisa-
tion policy that goes beyond mere approximation of existing legal 
provisions is necessary in this area (3.4.1), and go on to develop 
proposals that build on the beginnings already present in Com-
munity directives or draft directives, as weil as on relevant na-
tional provisions. 
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Cf. Chapter II, 3.3. 
3.4.1 Integration policy functions 
As far as national product safety policy is concemed, fol-
low-up market control essentially involves penalising breaches of 
product safety obligations, responding to newly identified risks 
and ensuring compensation for financial loss87. 
All these aspects are also relevant to a European product 
safety policy. Tue introduction of a general product safety obli-
gation would be practically meaningless if breaches were not 
punishable - the legal need for provision for follow-up action is 
incontrovertible in view of the inevitable gaps in preventive con-
trol measures, and any elimination of product risks must, in order 
to be fair, also ensure compensation for any damage or injury 
caused. 
However, these general safety policy tasks of follow-up 
market control, gain appreciably in importance in the context of 
the new harmonisation policy. Tue declared aim of the new ap-
proach is to improve the conditions for the marketability of prod-
ucts in the common market. This objective explains the provi-
sions for the equivalence of European standards and national 
standards (where included in the standards list), the admissibility 
of attestations of conformity for "products for which the manu-
facturer has not applied any standard", and mutual recognition of 
attestations of conformity issued by national certification bod-
ies88. However, these improvements to the conditions goveming 
the marketability of products, which are motivated by competi-
tion and intemal market policy considerations, inevitably rein-
force the legal need for surveillance of their confonnity to safety 
standards. Here too - as with the product safety obligation - the 
87 Cf. Chapter I, 3.3. 
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territorially restricted application of administrative measures 
means that Member States can react to identified product hazards 
only within their own territories. Each Member State has there-
fore to take such action on its own account. In addition to these 
functions, which are primarily concemed with safety policy, fol-
low-up market control also has genuine intemal market functions, 
which too have been taken into account in the Model Directive: 
easing the burden on the Community's legislative procedures 
with the new reference method has its price in terms of integra-
tion policy - it allows only the substantiation of market access 
rights on the basis of "presumption of confonnity", while con-
ceding to Member States the power to check the justification of 
such presumptions. Tue dangers that these Member States' pow-
ers pose to the unity of the intemal market can be countered only 
ex post in the safeguard clause procedure. However, this corrective 
function requires equivalent standards for follow-up market con-
troJ89 if it is to be effective. 
Tue new harmonisation policy has thus produced a 
"regulatory gap" as far as follow-up market control is concemed. 
This term refers to the inadvertent creation of a need for positive 
intervention by a policy aimed at market integration90. Indeed, 
the Member States have neglected the development of follow-up 
market control as an instrument for product safety policy91; now 
they are under pressure from the "anti-interventionist" principle 
of the free movement of goods and the "anti-interventionist" ref-
erence method to introduce positive regulation. This consequence 
appears paradoxical only at first sight. lt is in line with the logic 
of an integration policy that does not allow the achievements of a 
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90 
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Cf. Chapter IV, 3.3. 
Cf. Chapter IV, 3.4 for details. 
Cf. Bourgoignie/frubek, 1987, 3-4, 12 et seq„ 171-72. 
Cf. Chapter 1, 3.3 (end), and the description of the legal situation re-
garding follow-up market control in Member States in Chapter III, 3.4. 
single intemal market to be jeopardised again by one-sided and 
uncoordinated safety policy measures of Member States. 
3.4.2 Information sources 
The intensity with which Member States seek to detect haz-
ards is the essential determinant of the practical importance of 
their safety provisions, and the well-considered utilisation of in-
formation is one essential condition for rational use of adminis-
trative resources. To date, the Community has contributed to 
controlling the "information input" to follow-up market control 
essentially only through the decision on exchange of information 
on product hazards92. lt has however begun to build on this 
pledge. By Articles 12 and 13 of the draft Toy Directive93, Mem-
ber States would be obliged to verify observance of toy safety re-
quirements by export checks and inform the Commission on ap-
plication of the test and supervision procedures94. Similar super-
visory measures are provided for in the Directive on airborne 
noise emitted by household appliances95. Article 4 of the Direc-
tive on dangerous imitations of consumer goods96, finally, pro-
vides that information on measures taken by a Member State may 
be communicated prior to an "exchange of views" o:i their justifi-
cation. 
The most obvious way of systematically advancing from 
these starting points is offered by the demonstration project on a 
92 
93 
94 
95 
96 
OJ L 70, 13 March 1984, 16; on the limited scope of this decision and 
the need for its reform, see Chapter III, 3.4. 
OJ C 282, 8 November 1986, 4, amended proposal of 2 October 1987, 
COM (87) 467 final. 
On the "Europeanisation" of positive decisions cf. 3.4.4 infra. 
OJ L 344, 6 December 1986, 24 (Art. 5). 
OJ L 192, 11July1987, 49. 
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Community accident information system97. Its data can, as 
American experience with NEISS shows98, be utilised for follow-
up market control. Data from the European accident information 
system are suitable as a primary information source. Since they 
are collected according to uniform criteria Community-wide, 
making use of them would help to harmonise administrative 
practices99. 
However, accident information systems cannot be the sole 
source of information. Member States must be free to make use 
of their existing administrative facilities and, for example, to 
evaluate studies carried out by test institutes. However, a range of 
information sources should be underpined by uniform principles: 
the admissibility of consumer complaints, the admissibility of in-
put from consumer organisations, the obligation to take account 
of legal judgments conceming product liability, and an obligation 
of enterprises to provide notification whenever they possess 
knowledge from which it can be reasonably concluded that the 
products they market represent a significant hazard100. 
Consideration of legal judgments conceming product liabil-
ity fulfils a function specifically related to integration policy, be-
cause it indirectiylOI contributes towards the harmonisation of 
safety law criteria. In contrast, the obligation on enterprises to 
provide notification primarily furthers safety policy. Especially 
where serious risks are involved, enterprises will move to elimi-
nate them of their own accord, and for instance voluntarily make 
recallsl02. lt should not be assumed, however, that the willingness 
97 
98 
99 
Note 52 supra. 
Cf. Chapter II, 4.2. 
Though a prerequisite for this would be removal of the existing prohi-
bitions on using the data (cf. 3.2.1 supra, and Chapter III, 3.3). 
100 Cf. for US law as a model, Chapter II, 4.5.2. 
IOI Cf. 3.4.3 infra. 
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to do so exists throughout an entire industry or will (or even can) 
lead to corresponding action on export markets. Nevertheless, the 
obligation to provide notification would not only meet the safety 
requirements of consumers but also provide information on inad-
equacies of standards or deficiencies of national attestations of 
conformity. 
3 .4 .3 Requirements for intervention and instruments f or taking 
action 
Public law product safety duties are intended to provide the 
competent authorities with possibilities of intervention to ward 
off product hazards. In legally specifying such intervention 
rights, general clauses are indispensable. This follows even from 
the fact that product safety duties in the form of "basic safety re-
quirements" can in principle only set "performance require-
ments", but not prescribe definite design characteristics103. This 
is also in line with the regulatory functions of a general duty of 
product safety in the sense proposed above. While "legally" the 
general product safety obligation acts "preventively", it at the 
same time tums away in practice from the hopeless attempt to 
guarantee the safety of consumer goods preventively, by speci-
fying particular design requirements. But just because specific 
prior binding instructions are not given, govemment must never-
theless remain in a position to meet its responsibilities for prod-
uct safety by responding to dangers that do become evident. The 
embodiment of this power of intervention in the form of a general 
clause in safety law is thus the necessary consequence of aban-
doning specific govemmental product regulations. 
102 Cf. Chapter III, 3.4. 
103 For this distinction, see Chapter IV, 3.2. 
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But even if Community law preconditions for the interven-
tion powers of the competent authorities in Member States can 
thus be laid down only in general form, it is possible, and imper-
ative, to adopt detailed regulations on the instruments of follow-
up market control. Tue Directive on dangerous imitations of con-
sumer goodsl04 states that Member States should set up a body 
with powers to remove, or cause to be removed, products from 
the market (Article 3). Tue draft Toy DirectiveIOS says less 
specifically that Member States should "take all appropriate mea-
sures to withdraw" unsafe toys "from the market and prohibit 
their placing on the market" (Article 7 (1))106. 
lt does indeed seem appropriate to leave Member States the 
freedom to use institutional solutions that are in line with their 
various legal traditions. For example, the obvious approach for 
the Federal Republic of Germany would be to entrust follow-up 
market control to the industrial inspectorate 
(Gewerbeaufsicht)i07, while France would do best to maintain the 
division of functions between the Commission for Consumer 
Safety and government administrationl08, and the United King-
dom should retain the responsibility of Jocal authorities109. Fi-
nally, the establishment of independent cornmissions is also con-
ceivablel 10. 
104 Note 96 supra. 
105 Note 93 supra. 
l06 Cf. the corresponding provision of Article 7 of the Directive on air-
bome noise emitted by household appliances, note 95 supra. 
l07 Cf. Chapter II, 3.3.7. 
108 Cf. Chapter II, 1.5.1. 
109 Cf. Chapter II, 2.2.3, 2.3, 2.4.1. 
llO Cf. for example the proposals by A. Pauli, 1985, 180 et seq.; in the 
Netherlands, a Parliamentary initiative to supplement the Govemment 
Bill amending the "Warenwet" (note 77) specifies that responsibility 
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However, as regards the legal instruments tobe made avail-
able to these bodies, Community coordination would be advis-
able. Tue possibilities are bans, confiscations, recalls, wamings 
and compensation to consumers affected by recalls. 
Tue type of action taken should depend on the nature and 
severity of the hazards. Bans or even confiscations are not always 
necessary, but may sometimes be insufficient. lt may suffice to 
have the manufacturer rectify faults. However, it may also be 
necessary to have products replaced or recalled, with compensa-
tion for financial losses. Tue right to inform the public or demand 
that the manufacturer or importer provide appropriate inforrna-
tion is essential, but the necessity and nature of the information 
will in turn depend on the seriousness of the product risk. For ex-
ample, a public information campaign will not be required if the 
manufacturer is able to identify the customers concemed directly 
from its files and contact them. This particular example illustrates 
that the appropriate control measures should best be agreed in 
conjunction with the manufacturer or importer. A commitment by 
the concemed enterprise to propose, in the event of significant 
product hazards, a catalogue of measures for preventing such 
dangers, would normally enable a settlement to be reached, as is 
shown by the example ofUS lawIII. 
3 .4 .4 The role of the Community in follow-up market control 
Tue development of the law relating to follow-up market 
control is not an end in itself, but fulfils a dual function in terms 
of both safety policy and intemal market policy. Tue aim of Eu-
ropeanising follow-up market control is to reduce the potential 
lies with the Minister of Welfare, Public Health and Culture (Tweede 
Karner, vergaderjaar 1985-86, 17495 No. 22). 
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for conflict in the field of safety policy resulting from the objec-
tives of intemal market policy112, by Europeanising the practice 
of safety law. 
3.3.3.1 Stalldillg Committee oll techllical Standards alld 
regulatiolls allda "committee Oll follow-up market 
control" 
Tue Model Directive provides for all questions connected 
with the implementation of new directives to be handled by the 
Standing Committee on technical standards and regulations. 
However, the main task of this committee is to advise on new 
plans for directives and standards. In addition, the primary func-
tion of the safeguard procedure is to examine the quality of Euro-
pean and national standards and, when necessary, ensure that 
they are developed further. On the other hand, follow-up market 
control essentially involves executive tasks. Tue question of 
whether certain risks require intervention can be considered sepa-
rately from the question of whether these risks require changes to 
European or national standards. This distinction could also be 
taken into account in the institutional arrangements: the Standing 
Committee on technical standards and regulations should be re-
lieved of executive tasks to allow it to concentrate entirely on 
problems of legislation and standardisation. 
Tue executive tasks are difficult enough. Harmonisation of 
informational sources, conditions for intervention and instru-
ments of follow-up market control are necessary but not suffi-
cient conditions for achieving an equal standard of safety 
throughout Europe. Tue Community thus requires a body through 
which differences of opinion between the competent bodies can 
111 Cf. Chapter II, 4.5., note 154. 
112 Cf. Chapter IV, 3.4, and Chapter V, 3. to 4. 
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be argued out and settled. With a view to harmonising practice in 
Member States, their inclusion on a "Committee on follow-up 
market control" is to be recommended here as weil. However, 
since it will be concemed with executive questions, this commit-
tee does not need the legal status of an administrative or regula-
tory committee, but should be set up as a subcommittee of the 
Advisory Committee on product safety proposed abovell3. 
Making the administration of fo!low-up market control in-
stitutionally autonomous does not immediately seem to be in line 
with approaches in the Community's recent legal acts in the area. 
Tue Directive on airbome noise emitted by household appli-
ances114 explicitly refers all questions in connection with its im-
plementation to the Standing Committee set up by Directive 
83/189/EEC (Article 9 (1))115. Tue draft Toy Directive116 takes 
the position that the Commission alone will decide on questions 
of follow-up market control (Article 7 (4)), and where shortcom-
ings in harmonised standards or gaps in the standards become ap-
parent, will provide for consultation of the Standing Committee 
on technical standards and regulations (Articles 5 and 7 (2)). Tue 
Directive on dangerous imitations of consumer goods entrusted 
the Advisory Committee on information exchange on dangers 
arising from the use of consumer products, set up by Decision 
84/133 of 2 March 1984, with the tasks of coordinating measures 
by individual States117. 
113 3.1 supra. 
114 Note 95 supra. 
115 On problems of the differential treatment of objections to European 
stanaards on the one hand and to national standards on the other, see 
Chapter IV, 5.3. 
116 Note 93 supra. 
117 The reference to the decision (note 92 supra) can be found in Article 4 
of the new Directive (note 96 supra). 
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3.3.3.2 Decision-making powers of the Commission 
Tue above-mentioned functions of the Europeanisation of 
follow-up market control entail requirements that cannot be met 
simply by an exchange of infonnation restricted to the authorities 
concemed, which leaves any reaction to hazards at the discretion 
of Member States. Tue Community must therefore go well be-
yond the Council Decision of 2 March 198411 8. lt requires com-
prehensive information and considerable decision-making pow-
ers. 
Initially, it needs tobe informed of decisions by the compe-
tent bodies in the Member States. However, the obligation on 
Member States to supply infonnation should not be confined to 
cases where positive measures are ordered. lt ought also to cover 
cases where a settlement was reached or where intervention was 
rejected, since such procedures are no less important for the har-
monisation of administrative practice, and their justification can 
be just as questionable as the ordering of positive measures. De-
cision-making in the Commission and the Advisory Committee 
on follow-up market control proposed here can also be aided by 
the findings of the demonstration project on accident infonnation 
systems, as well as by other own sources of information. Con-
sumer organisations should be allowed to approach the Commis-
sion, and the "Consumers' Consultative Committee on standardi-
sation"119 should have access to Commission decisions. 
Two types of decision in the area of follow-up market con-
trol can be distinguished: responses to urgent measures and 
definitive decisions on conflicts conceming the justification or 
118 Note 92 supra. 
119 3.2.2 supra. 
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necessity of measures. In cases of "serious and immediate risk", 
which already have tobe notified "immediately" to the Commis-
sion under Article 1 (1) of the Council Decision of 2 March 1984, 
the safety policy function of follow-up market control calls for 
the Commission to have the authority to order other Member 
States to take provisional measures. However, such measures 
should then be discussed with the Advisory Committee on fol-
low-up market control before the Commission takes a final deci-
sion. In all cases where no immediate action is required on the 
part of the Commission, the Committee should be consulted be-
fore a decision is taken. Its participation is essential for the de-
velopment of common assessment criteria in the Community. 
4. Institutional measures to coordinate internal market and 
product safety policy 
The network of committees and eo-operative relationships 
sketched out in the foregoing sections may look over-differenti-
ated and too intricate. Nevertheless, all these proposals are ulti-
mately concemed only with the institutional consequences of two 
conceptual premises embodied in the Community's objectives for 
realising the intemal market themselves. The first premise con-
cems the relationship between intemal market and product safety 
policies. lt states that the legal harmonisation essential in the in-
terest of free movement of goods in the Community is insepara-
bly linked with the elaboration of a European product safety pol-
icy, but that both elements of the integration process, that is, 
mutual interpenetration of economic sectors on the one hand, and 
the achievement of closer integration through a European product 
safety policy on the other, call for separate forward-looking poli-
cies and organisational structures. This premise is the basis for 
the proposals for giving the tasks in internal market policy and in 
product safety policy an independent organisational form in dif-
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ferent ways, related to the historical separation of these policy ar-
eas in the Community. Tue second premise concems the Com-
munity's relationships with Member States, and states that both 
for its legal harmonisation policy and the Europeanisation of ad-
ministrative tasks essential in connection with it, the Community 
is dependent on continuing co-operation with Member States. 
This need for co-operation is confirmed not only by theoretical 
analysis of the Community's political system and of specific fea-
tures of European federalism120, but also by the practice of 
Community politics, where decision-making processes are open 
at all levels to influence from the Member States. This develop-
ment has gone hand in hand with the setting up of administrative, 
regulatory and advisory committees, something that started early 
in intemal market policy, and is also indispensable in product 
safety policy. 
A first conclusion drawn from these premises is the proposal 
to set up, alongside the Standing Committee on technical stan-
dards and regulations created by the Information Directive 
83/189/EEC, a Standing Committee on product safetyl21. lt is in-
dubitable that, in drawing up directives and standardisation man-
dates, safety concems belong among the most important tasks for 
the Standing Committee on technical standards and regulations. 
But whether at national or Community level, product safety pol-
icy is not confined to questions of law-making and standardisa-
tion. Instead, it belongs much more in the whole context of com-
prehensive, varied machinery for guaranteeing consumer safety. 
Tue Community must in the long term develop such a policy, and 
will in doing so, be dependent on eo-Operation with the compe-
tent bodies and institutions responsible for product safety policy 
in Member States. Equally, a legal harmonisation policy con-
cemed with achieving the intemal market has to concentrate on 
120 Cf. Chapter III, 1.2. 
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the steps necessary to that end, and thus set its priorities primarily 
from an economic viewpoint, on which it will seek the necessary 
agreements. Accordingly, organisational differentiation between 
intemal market and product safety policy does not in any way 
promote competing political projects, but instead aims at easing 
the burden on both areas and promoting their co-operation. 
A second organisational proposal, namely to set up a Con-
sumers' Consultative Committee on standardisation122, is con-
nected with the differentiation between intemal market and prod-
uct safety policy and the Community's relationship with Member 
States, but is primarily a consequence of the technique of refer-
ence to standards favoured in the new harmonisation policy. This 
legal technique links up the European standardisation organisa-
tions on "functional" law-making tasks. Because of these de facto 
effects of the reference technique, the justification for calls for 
consumer participation is in principle indisputable. Our proposals 
for giving shape to this participation are meant to implement this 
concept, so as to take account of the organisational and staff con-
straints on consumer organisations and formally guarantee them 
possibilities of collaboration. 
The third proposal, namely to set up a separate committee 
on follow-up market control, is a direct consequence of the dis-
tinction between intemal market and product safety policy, but is 
also connected with the peculiarities of the new legal harmonisa-
tion method. On our proposal, the tasks of verifying the substance 
of European and national standards and developing them further 
should remain with the Standing Committee on technical stan-
dards and regulations, since from a functional viewpoint this is a 
future oriented Iaw-making activity. Follow-up market control is, 
121 Cf. 3.1 supra. 
122 Cf. 3.2.2 supra. 
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instead, often concemed with urgent decisions to deal with acute 
dangers to consumer safety. In each case, where such decisions 
need to be implemented, the Community is de facto dependent on 
co-operation from the competent authorities in Member States. 
By its very nature, the case is one of nothing less than the Euro-
peanisation of administrative tasks. In view of these far-reaching 
implications, it would seem appropriate to create the organisa-
tional prerequisites for setting administrative co-operation be-
tween Community and Member States on a permanent footing. 
In conclusion, the institutional proposals in this section are 
set out below in an overview: 
Table 3: Overview of Standing Committees in the area of intemal market 
and product safety policies 
Interna/ market policyProduct safety po/icy 
Involvement of Standing Committee on technical Standing 
Committee on product 
Member States standards and regulations (1983 safety (future Product 
Information Directive and 1985 Safety Directive) 
Model Directive) 
Subcommittees for individual Committee on accident 
directives (e.g. for simple information systems 
pressure vessels, toys, (Council Decision 
construction products) of 22 April 1986) 
Committee on follow-up 
market control (future 
product safety Directive) 
Involvement of CEN/CENELEC Consumers' Consultative 
Committee on non-governmental 
standardisation 
actors 
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